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Instrumentalizing the Expressive: Transplanting
Sentencing Circles into the Canadian Criminal Trial
Toby S. Goldbach∗

ABSTRACT
This Article examines reforms to criminal sentencing procedures in
Canada, focusing on Aboriginal healing circles, which were incorporated as
“sentencing circles” into the criminal trial. Using the lens of comparative law
and legal transplants, this Article recounts the period of sentencing reform in
Canada in the 1990s, when scholars, practitioners, and activists inquired into
Aboriginal confrontation with the criminal justice system by comparing EuroCanadian and Aboriginal justice values and principles. As a way to bridge the
gap between vastly differing worldviews and approaches to justice, judges and
Aboriginal justice advocates transplanted sentencing circles into the
sentencing phase of the criminal trial. This Article presents original data
compiled from a review of all published decisions in Canada that mention the
term sentencing circle. It reviews judicial treatment of requests for sentencing
circles, and tracks sentencing decisions once a circle was held. Additionally,
this Article uses sentencing circles as a point of entry into conversations about
legal instrumentalism in law reform and legal transplants. It argues that the
progress of these reforms points to larger questions about culture and what it
currently means to use law as a tool for social change.
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INTRODUCTION

Today’s legal environment is one of creation, adaptation, and change. 1
Whether in the pursuit of economic development, 2 democratization, 3 or

1 See John H. Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style, Decline
and Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 457, 457 (1977); Harold
Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 184, 205 (1996) (“Once nations
begin to interact, a complex process occurs, whereby international legal norms seep into, are
internalized, and become embedded in domestic legal and political processes.”); Terence C.
Halliday, Architects of the State: International Financial Institutions and the Reconstruction of
States in East Asia, 37(2) L. & SOC. INQUIRY 265, 266 (2012); Gregory Shaffer, Transnational
Legal Process and State Change, 37 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 229, 229 (2012); Terence C. Halliday,
Recursivity of Global Normmaking: A Sociolegal Agenda, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 263 (2009).
But see Robert A. Kagan, Globalization and Legal Change: The “Americanization” of European
Law?, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 99, 100 (2007) (challenging the suggestion that law in Western
Europe is converging “with the American ‘way of law,’ particularly at the level of European
nation-states, whose domestic legal systems and institutions still bulk large in the lives of
individuals, business firms, and other organizations.”).

See, e.g., Ronald J. Daniels et al., The Legacy of Empire: The Common Law Inheritance and
Commitments to Legality in Former British Colonies, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 111 (2011) (reviewing
the literature on the relationship between legal transplants and economic development); Rafael
La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285, 302,
324–25 (2008) (describing the reasons for legal transplants and examining the economic effects of
legal origins, in particular the effect of common law legal systems on per capita income, investor
protection, and financial development); see generally MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & RONALD J.
DANIELS, RULE OF LAW REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT: CHARTING THE FRAGILE PATH OF PROGRESS
1–12 (2008).
2
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political or social harmonization, 4 identifying best practices 5 and
transporting them elsewhere has become common-fare. Scholars who focus on
“legal transplants” 6 tend to address two main sets of questions: first, how
3 See, e.g., Kim Seong-Hyun, The Democratization and Internationalization of the Korean Legal
Field, in LAWYERS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 217, 229–35 (Yves
Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2011); Hiroshi Fukurai, Japan’s Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury
Systems as Deliberative Agents of Social Change: De-Colonial Strategies and Deliberative
Participatory Democracy, 86 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 789, 791 (2011) (arguing that the introduction of
the quasi-jury and grand jury in Japan brought citizen oversight of the politically elite—who
were formerly considered political “untouchables”); Zachary Corey & Valerie P. Hans, Japan’s
New Lay Judge System: Deliberative Democracy in Action?, 12 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 72, 89
(2010) (considering the potential of the new lay judge system in Japan to generate “legitimizing
and civic engagement effects”).

See, e.g., Mads Andenas et al., Towards a Theory of Harmonisation, in THEORY AND PRACTICE
HARMONISATION 572, 573 (Mads Andenas & Camilla Baasch Andersen eds., 2011)
(“Harmonisation has been an important feature of modern legal systems . . . . For example,
harmonization has been a core instrument of the European Union and Council of Europe, whilst
at the international global level, there has been a long and established tradition of
harmonisation of commercial law . . . .”); see generally John H. Merryman, On the Convergence
(and Divergence) of the Civil Law and the Common Law, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L. 357 (1981)
(outlining the political and cultural factors that both promote convergence of legal systems and
provide a force for decentralization); but see Reinhard Zimmermann, Civil Code and Civil Law:
The “Europeanization” of Private Law Within the European Community and the Re-Emergence of
a European Legal Science, 1 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, 73, 77–78 (1994) (discussing the
implementation of directives—which allow national governments to choose the form and method
of compliance—as a mechanism for harmonization and detailing the negative consequences of
using directives, such as increased fragmentation as a result of having two sets of rules, or legal
ossification as a result of the difficult process in generating initial agreement on the directive).
4

OF

David Kennedy, The “Rule of Law,” Political Choices, and Development Common Sense, in THE
NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 95, 155 (David M. Trubek &
Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (discussing development professionals’ turn away from economic
analysis after the currency crisis of the 1990s to the identification of “best practices” in economic
development and performance); Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on
Developing Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 97, 97 (2002) (discussing the expectation that adopting
“best practices” and incorporating legal standards into conventions and treaties will have the
“double benefit of reducing transaction costs for transnational investors and increasing the
quality of legal institutions” in developing countries); see also Jonathan Hill, Comparative Law,
Law Reform and Legal Theory, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1989) (discussing the approach of
“better solution” comparative law scholars, who advocate for objective evaluation of the various
solutions provided by the world’s legal systems, and challenging the premise that there can be
objectivity in identifying best practices).
5

See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 7, 19 (2d ed.
1993) (arguing that comparative law is predominantly the study of a history of legal exchanges
between legal systems, which consists of borrowing and modifying legal rules, and thus
comparative law methodology should focus on legal transplants—the “borrowing and
transmissibility of rules from one society or system to another” for the purpose of legal
development); Daniel Berkowitz et al., Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant
Effect, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 165, 174 (2003) (explaining the meaning of a legal transplant could be
understood as follows: “[w]hen a transplant country applies a rule that it has transplanted from
an origin, it is effectively applying a rule to its own local circumstances that was developed in a
foreign socioeconomic order”); THE COMMON CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (Mauro Bussani &
Ugo Mattei eds., 2003); Michele Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and
Receptions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, 441–74 (Mathias Reimann &

6
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legal rules or institutions travel, 7 and second, how foreign laws interact with
domestic legal systems. 8 Scholars generally do not contest that transplanted
legal institutions have the potential to solve socio-legal problems.
Transplanting legal institutions is a matter “of usefulness and need. No one
bothers to fetch a thing from afar when he has one as good or better at home .
. . .” 9
Unfortunately, scholars have not examined institutions that are
transplanted, not as a result of their usefulness, but rather because of their
cultural and symbolic import. 10 Are the problems raised by using legal
transplants to represent cultural and humanistic goals different from other
cases where there is a transplant effect?
This Article discusses reforms to Canadian criminal sentencing
procedures and the incorporation of Aboriginal methods into the criminal
trial. In particular, this Article presents the transplanted “sentencing
circle” 11 as an example of how legal scholars’ and practitioners’ views
regarding legal instrumentalism 12 might be changing. This Article claims
Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006) (citing three causes for the movement of law: power, prestige,
and institutional change aimed at improving economic performance).
See, e.g., Ron Harris & Michael Crystal, Some Reflections on the Transplantation of British
Company Law in Post-Ottoman Palestine, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRY L. 561 (2009) (examining
company law transplants in Palestine in the early 20th Century and arguing that lawyers, legal
academics, and colonial legislators influenced the exportation of English company law to
countries in the British Empire); see also WATSON, supra note 6.

7

8 See, e.g., Berkowitz et al., supra note 6, at 174 (arguing that a legal transplant “increases its
own receptivity [in the import country] by making a significant adaptation of the foreign formal
legal order to initial conditions, in particular to the preexisting formal and informal legal order.
Changes in the transplanted rules or legal institutions indicate that the appropriateness of these
rules has been considered and modifications were made to take into account domestic legal
practice or other initial conditions.”) (emphasis in the original); see generally Máximo Langer,
From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the
Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1 (2004) (examining the ways
that local legal cultures in Germany, Italy, Argentina, and France interacted with the
importation of American-style plea bargaining); Toby Goldbach et al., The Movement of U.S.
Criminal and Administrative Law: Processes of Transplanting and Translating, 20 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 141, 158–60, 164–67 (2013) (arguing that legal elites in Asia both imported
and modified U.S. criminal procedures, such as plea bargaining and procedures for a jury trial
for use in the criminal trial).
9 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖETZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 17 (Tony Weir
trans., 3d ed. 1998).
10

See discussion infra Part IV. A.

I refer to the traditional Aboriginal process and the process incorporated into the criminal trial
by the following terms: “healing circle” and “sentencing circle” respectively. Some texts,
government documents, and cases use these terms interchangeably. While there is no one form of
healing circle that covers all traditional processes, I try to keep the terms separate, in the very
least to place an emphasis on the process of transplantation.
11

On the meaning of legal instrumentalism, see generally Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic
Jurisprudence—the Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 452 (1930) (“It seems patent that only a

12
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that law reform goals have become more “expressive,” 13 in that they include
cultural and normative goals in addition to, or instead of, sociological goals.
The effect is to “instrumentalize” 14 culture and normativity. 15 In
gain in realism and effectiveness of thinking can come from consistently (not occasionally)
regarding the official [legal] formulation as a tool, not as a thing of value in itself; as a means
without meaning save in terms of its workings, and of meaning in its workings only when these
last are compared with the results desired.”); John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL
L.Q. 17, 23, 26 (1924) (“As matter of actual fact, we generally begin with some vague anticipation
of a conclusion (or at least of alternative conclusions), and then we look around for principles and
data which will substantiate it or which will enable us to choose intelligently between rival
conclusions. No lawyer ever thought out the case of a client in terms of the syllogism. He begins
with a conclusion which he intends to reach, favorable to his client of course, and then analyzes
the facts of the situation to find material out of which to construct a favorable statement of facts,
to form a minor premise.”); PATRICK S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS 93 (1987) (“rules are conceived essentially as instruments—as means to sound
goals . . . .”). On the place of legal instrumentalism in legal scholarship, see ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 31, 35, 60 (1982) (the most
sustained and prominent belief about law in the last hundred years has been that law is a social
instrument; social reality is malleable and can be altered “by humans for human purposes in the
course of solving problems”); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE
RULE OF LAW 118 (2006) (“Almost all of the major theoretical and empirical perspectives toward
law that circulate today . . . characterize law in fundamentally instrumental terms.”); Mark
Kelman, The Past and Future of Legal Scholarship, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 432, 433 (1983) (“The
instinct of most law professors—again when discussing big concepts, like the nature of
property—is unquestionably to be highly positivistic and instrumentalist”); Austin Sarat &
Susan Silbey, The Pull of the Policy Audience, 10 L. & POL’Y 97, 104 (1988) (“At the beginning of
the 20th century, the modest reform efforts of legal realism advanced an instrumentalist concept
of law. In this, legal realism reacted against then prevailing formalist conceptions of law and
worked to adapt legal thought to . . . one in which the state came to assume a much more explicit
role in steering society); see generally Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat, Studying How Law
Matters: An Introduction, in HOW DOES LAW MATTER? (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds.,
1998); Richard L. Abel, Law and Society: Project and Practice, 6 ANN. REV. L & SOC. SCI. 1
(2010); Daphna Hacker, Law and Society Jurisprudence, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 727, 742 (2011)
(examining the place of legal instrumentalist thought and the “preoccupation” with “legal
reforms aimed at achieving social goals” in the Law and Society movement in Israel). On the
distinction between “law as a tool” and legal techniques, see Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for
the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the Technicalities, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 973, 975 (2005)
[hereinafter Taking on the Technicalities] (arguing that both instrumentalist and
cultural/humanistic studies of law ignore the technical dimensions of legal form: “To the
instrumentalist . . . the technical details of doctrine are interesting only insofar as they are
relevant to what lawyers sometimes term ‘building a better mousetrap.’ They do not become the
subject of any deeper or more critical inquiry.”); and see generally Alain Pottage, Law After
Anthropology: Object and Technique in Roman Law, 31 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 147 (2014).
See Annelise Riles, Law as Object, in LAW & EMPIRE IN THE PACIFIC: FIJI AND HAWAI’I, 187–212
(Sally Engle Merry & Donald Brenneis eds., 2004) [hereinafter Law as Object].

13

Alain Pottage, The Socio-Legal Implications of the New Biotechnologies, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 321, 324 (2007).
14

See generally JUTTA BRUNNÉE & STEPHEN J. TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTERACTIONAL ACCOUNT 33–55, 85 (2010) (providing an account of the
role of procedural fairness values in international law and international relations: “Interactional
law undercuts the ability of powerful actors to put forward utterly self-serving or perverse
normative claims, because the claims will have to be measured against the eight criteria of
15
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transplanting Aboriginal justice methods into Euro-Canadian criminal trials,
justice advocates intended to recognize Aboriginal peoples’ rights in the
administration of justice. 16 This then poses the following questions: How do

legality, and will have to fit within shared understandings generated through inclusive
participation of all social actors.”). For the most obvious example of melding instrumental and
normative goals as the rule of law in Law and Development projects, see Kennedy, supra note 5,
at 156–57 (providing an account of how human rights and the rule of law have been incorporated
into the meaning of development); TREBILCOCK & DANIELS, supra note 2, at 4 (2008) (examining
the role of the rule of law in development: “the claim that the robustness of a country’s
commitment to the rule of law is an important determinant of its development trajectory rests
upon both instrumental foundations and on intrinsic or deontological foundations.”). Another
example is the proliferation of new jury and lay judge systems in Eastern Europe and East Asia
in support of democratic reforms. See Hiroshi Fukurai et al., The Resurgence of Lay Adjudicatory
Systems in East Asia, 12 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. i, iii (2010) (comparing the “wave” of legal
reforms to introduce lay judges in East Asia to trial by jury in the 19th Century, which “became
an integral part of the emerging democratic societies in the U.S. and other nations on the
European Continent”); Fukurai, supra note 3; Ryan Park, The Globalization of the Jury Trial:
Lessons and Insights from Korea, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 525, 534–35, 546 (2010) (examining the
connection between lay participation in judicial decision-making and “broader democratic
governance,” and recounting the introduction of the jury trial as part of efforts to democratize
Eastern Europe in the 1990s and South Korea in the late 1990s and early 2000s); Richard O.
Lempert, The Internationalization of Lay Legal Decision-Making: Jury Resurgence and Jury
Research, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 477, 479 (2007); NIKOLAI KOVALEV, CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM
IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE AND THE FORMER REPUBLICS OF THE SOVIET UNION: TRIAL BY JURY AND
MIXED COURTS 2–3 (2010) (noting that many countries formerly part of the Soviet Union are
introducing lay judge reforms, “transitioning” their criminal justice systems at the same time as
undertaking political and economic transitions to democracy and free market economy). For more
traditional portrayals of legal transplants as a consequence of pressure, prestige, or instrumental
rationality, see generally Graziadei, supra note 6; La Porta et al., supra note 2; Ugo Mattei,
Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative Law and Economics, 14 INT’L REV. L.
& ECON. 1, 16 (1994).
MINISTRY OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, OTTAWA (ONTARIO), TASK FORCE ON ABORIGINAL
PEOPLES IN FEDERAL CORRECTIONS, FINAL REPORT 10–11 (1988); PAUL L.A.H. CHARTRAND,
ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, BRIDGING THE CULTURAL DIVIDE: A REPORT ON
ABORIGINAL PEOPLE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CANADA 3 (1996) [hereinafter BRIDGING THE
CULTURAL DIVIDE] (“The right of Aboriginal self-government is argued to be a common law right
in Canada, one that is protected by the Constitution. Aboriginal control over the substance and
process of justice flowing from the Aboriginal right of self-government would permit the
contemporary expression of Aboriginal concepts and processes of justice.”); ROYAL COMMISSION
ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, 1 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES 610,
679–81 (1996); John Giokas, Accommodating the Concerns of Aboriginal People Within the
Existing Justice System, in ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 184, 184 (Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples eds., 1992) (“This paper has been written against the
backdrop of this national and international drive of Aboriginal peoples for a greater degree of
control over their own affairs. The basic theme of this paper can be summarized in one word:
emergence. A new order is emerging in Canada that will cover most important aspects of the new
relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians . . . . Justice administration is
one of those areas.”); Donald Clairmont, Alternative Justice Issues for Aboriginal Justice, 36 J.
LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 125, 125 (1996); see R. v. Morin (I.) (1995), 134 Sask. R. 120,
para. 27 (Can. Sask. C.A.) (“The very purpose of sentencing circles seems to be to fashion
sentences that will differ in some mix or measure from those which the courts have up to now
imposed in order to take into account aboriginal culture and traditions, and in order to permit
and to take into account direct community participation in both imposition and administration of
16
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we measure the impact, effects, or the extent of “translation” 17 in such cases?
What is the effect of transplanting legal institutions that are intended to
fulfill both sociological and corrective justice goals? What if, in addition to
being an example of best practices, the legal transplant is also meant to
signify a move toward repairing historical injustices?
In 1992, Justice Barry Stuart of the Yukon Territorial Court used an
approach based on local First Nations’ methods of dealing with crime. 18 This
was the first instance of adapting an Aboriginal healing circle for use in a
Canadian criminal trial. 19 Following Justice Stuart’s example, other trial
judges began to conduct sentencing circles on an ad hoc basis as part of the
discretion they had in sentencing decisions. 20 By the mid-1990s, judicial
innovation, legislative reform, and bureaucratic efforts effectively
“transplanted” Aboriginal healing circles into the criminal trial. Presently,
sentencing circles contribute to the institutionalized landscape to such an
extent that in April 2014 the Ministry of the Attorney General (Ontario)
unveiled a new courthouse with rooms specifically designed for Aboriginal
conferencing and ceremonies. 21
Sentencing circles are a legal procedure in which “the community offers
its input to the sentencing court.” 22 During a sentencing circle, criminal
justice participants and members of the community have an opportunity to
speak about the crime in question and its impact on the community. 23 The
the sentence.”); see also discussion of the Aboriginal Justice Initiative and Aboriginal Justice
Strategy infra Part II.B.
17

Langer, supra note 8, at 13–14.

This first sentencing circle took place in Mayo, Yukon in R. v. Moses, [1992] B.C.W.L.D. 1294
(Can. Y.K.T.C.), additional reasons provided in R. v. Moses, [1992] 71 C.C.C. (3d) 347 (Can.
Y.K.T.C.) and were as a result of consultations between the Kwanlin Dun First Nation and
justice officials. THE CHURCH COUNCIL ON JUSTICE & CORRECTIONS, SATISFYING JUSTICE: A
COMPENDIUM OF INITIATIVES, PROGRAMS AND LEGISLATIVE MEASURES (1996); see also BRIDGING
THE CULTURAL DIVIDE, supra note 16, at 110.
18

R. v. Nicholas (B.L.) (1996), 177 N.B.R. 2d 124 (Can. N.B.P.C.); BARRY STUART, BUILDING
COMMUNITY JUSTICE PARTNERSHIPS: COMMUNITY PEACEMAKING CIRCLES 124 (1997),
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2009/justice/J22-12-1997E.pdf.
19

Heino Lilles, Circle Sentecing: Part of the Restorative Justice Continuum, INT’L INST. FOR
RESTORATIVE PRACTICES (Aug. 9, 2002), www.iirp.edu/article_detail.php?article_id=NDQ3. The
common law authority for conducting sentencing circles was found by Justice Sherstobitoff of the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in R. v. Morin (I.) (1995), 134 Sask.R. 120 (Can. Sask. C.A.).
20

MINISTRY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, ABORIGINAL CONFERENCE SETTLEMENT SUITE FINAL
REPORT (2009); Thunder Bay Courthouse—Adamson Associates Architects, ARCHDAILY,
http://www.archdaily.com/511799/thunder-bay-courthouse-adamson-associates-architects/ (last
visited Feb. 2, 2016).
21

22

R. v. Cooper (2010), 101 O.R. 3d 1 (Can. Ont. C.A.).

Maureen Linker, Sentencing Circles and the Dilemma of Difference, 42 CRIM. L.Q. 116, 117
(1999) (“The judge’s role is to oversee discussion and seek out answers to the following kinds of
questions: What are the underlying causes of the crime? What impact has the crime had on the
23
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number of participants can vary from ten to fifty individuals. 24 In sentencing
circles, which may last several hours, participants often make sentencing
recommendations. At the conclusion of a sentencing circle that the court
holds as part of an adult criminal trial, the participants return the matter to
the court for final submissions and judicial decision. The law does not require
the judge to follow the sentencing circle’s reccommendations. 25 In many ways,
though, sentencing circles represent an exception to the trend currently
underway in common law countries to curtail lay participation in
sentencing. 26 Therefore, because sentencing circles involve significant
community participation, it is important to analyze whether, and how, judges
respond to sentencing circle recommendations in the final sentencing stage.
An additional goal of this Article is to identify and present a cultural
turn in legal thinking, one in which the expressive genre of law (which
generates and produces meaning) 27 serves to mark and achieve other goals.
This Article presents a story of legal pluralism, attempts at multiculturalism,
Aboriginal law, and alternatives to criminal sentencing procedures. On a
deeper level, however, it provides an account of legal instrumentalism and
what it currently means to use law as a tool for social change.
In Canadian sentencing reform, through an exercise in comparative
criminal law, 28 scholars, practitioners, and activists made Aboriginal culture
into an object of knowledge 29 and then constructed expressions of Aboriginal
culture as instruments of legal value. Government studies and legal reports
compared Euro-Canadian and Aboriginal approaches to justice, and
victim, his or her family, and the community? What are the details of all the potential sentences .
. . ?”). See, e.g., R. v. Van Bibber, [2010] Y.K.T.C. 49 (Can.); R. v. MacKendrick, [2007]
B.C.W.L.D. 6450 (Can. B.C.P.C.) (finding that the “unusual nature and number of victims in the
Langley community who were adversely affected” by the crime made the use of a sentencing
circle even more poignant). But see Mary Crnkovich, A Sentencing Circle, 36 J. LEGAL PLURALISM
& UNOFFICIAL L. 159, 165 (1996) (describing a sentencing circle that took place in the Nanuvik
region of Quebec where the community’s role was unclear).
24

Lilles, supra note 20.

R. v. Taylor (1995), 132 Sask. R. 221, para. 10 (Can. Sask. Q.B.) (“It must be remembered that
the recommendation of a circle is not binding on the sentencing judge.”); see also BRIDGING THE
CULTURAL DIVIDE, supra note 16, at 110, 113–14; infra note 41 and accompanying text.
discussion infra note 41.
25

See Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three-State
Study, 57 VAND. L. REV. 885 (2004); Toby S. Goldbach & Valerie P. Hans, Juries, Lay Judges,
and Trials, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Gerben Bruinsma &
David Weisburd eds., 2014) (showing how in Canada, juries may give recommendations for
parole in first and second degree murder trials; the law restricts lay participation to those
circumstances, and jury recommendations are not mandatory).
26

27

Law as Object, supra note 13.

28

Markus D. Dubber, Criminal Law in Comparative Context, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 433 (2006).

Law as Object, supra note 13; see generally MARIANA VALVERDE, LAW’S DREAM OF A COMMON
KNOWLEDGE (2003).
29
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connected sociological and political adversity with the need for justice reform.
Advocates explicitly distinguished Aboriginal healing circles from official
state procedures and then presented the former as an alternative dispute
resolution process with equally legitimate jurisdictional claims. With that
legal authority, culturally appropriate processes became an instrument that
law reformers could use to address normative and sociological goals.
Though often thought of as progressive in its pragmatic approach to law,
there is a sense that legal instrumentalism, “the hegemonic logic of means
and ends,” 30 risks destabilizing developments in its effort to deem everything
up for instrumental grabs. Therefore, instrumentalizing the expressive—
fashioning constructed expressions of culture into an instrument for use—
may present new and troubling implications for what it means to employ the
law as a tool metaphor. Scholars, practitioners, and reformers should become
more familiar with the ways that back and forth movement between the
instrumental and the expressive present a moment of jeopardy for unmet
expectations. In the very least, they should make use of the technical legal
devices and knowledge practices to which legal intermediaries regularly
appeal. 31
This Article employs a mixed methodology; it looks at government, task
force, and law reform commission reports, as well as all published decisions
where sentencing circles were requested and/or used. Part II reviews more
thoroughly the background and situates the reforms in comparative law
literature in order to give context to the kinds of conversations that were
going on about how to change criminal sentencing in Canada. Readers might
react negatively towards Aboriginal law analyzed within the framework of
comparative law and legal transplants. Clearly, the histories of colonial
relations and confrontations with indigenous communities, marked by
paternalism and overt efforts to suppress culture, preclude adopting the “apolitical” comparative law analysis. 32 However, one of the underlying goals of

Annelise Riles, Anthropology, Human Rights, and Legal Knowledge: Culture in the Iron Cage,
108 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 52, 60 (2006).

30

See, e.g., Taking on the Technicalities, supra note 12; see generally Alain Pottage, The
Materiality of What?, 39 J.L. & SOC’Y 167 (2012) [hereinafter The Materiality of What?].

31

32 See David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International
Governance, 2 UTAH L. REV. 545, 554 (1997) (Comparative law “see[s] itself as precisely not about
politics or governance, as existing rather in the realm of history or thought, as an intellectual
project of understanding between cultures whose similarities and differences are foregrounded.”).
In particular, legal anthropologists might be concerned that commissions and task forces
constructed an Aboriginal sentencing process. See, e.g., Martin Chanock, The Law Market: The
Legal Encounter in British East and Central Africa, in EUROPEAN EXPANSION AND LAW (W. J.
Mommsen & J. A. de Moor eds., 1992); Marilyn Strathern, Discovering ‘Social Control’, 12 J. L. &
SOC’Y 111, 111 (1985); Peter Fitzpatrick, Traditionalism and Traditional Law, 28 J. AFR. L. 20
(1984). However, a sole focus on the expressive or meaning-making genre of law can overlook
results of the second genre of law-making where law is a thing in the world. See Law as Object,
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this Article is to present the example of transplanted Aboriginal methods as a
means to disturb convenient encampments. By invoking the transplant
metaphor and examining the types of questions comparative law scholars
ask, 33 this Article seeks to confront divisions between comparative law, 34
legal pluralism, 35 and law and development literature. 36 Sitting at the
intersection of those three disciplines, sentencing circles are uniquely
positioned to prompt readers to consider assumptions about whose law is fit
for transplanting and the kinds of questions that are asked in certain areas of
law.
Part II chronicles a period of intense government scrutiny into Aboriginal
confrontation with the criminal justice system, the initial legislative and
judicial reforms, the subsequent transplantation, and the institutionalization
of sentencing circles into the criminal trial.
Part III adopts the typical comparative law and legal transplant
approach, examining the process of transplantation and how sentencing
circles fared once transplanted into the Euro-Canadian legal system. This
Part presents a brief qualitative report of findings from all published
Canadian decisions that dealt with sentencing circles, ranging from the first
time a sentencing circle was held during a criminal trial in 1992 to decisions
as recent as 2010. 37 This Article analyzes the outcomes of requests to hold a
supra note 13, at 190. Put most simply, sentencing circles have been incorporated, transplanted,
and used in the criminal trial. So, it still bears worth to investigate how this played out.
See Mitchel Lasser, The Question of Understanding, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES:
TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 197, 197–239 (Pierre Legrand & R. J. C. Munday eds., 2003).
33

34 Each of these sub-disciplines explores the movement of law and the interaction between
culture, local needs, and official (state) legal orders, but they tend to adhere to their own
constituencies: Comparative Law to European and North American audiences. See, e.g., THE
COMMON CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, supra note 6; Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of
Legal Transplants, 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 111 (1997); Mathias Reimann, The
Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J.
COMP. L. 671 (2002).
35 Legal Pluralism explores African or Western informal, customary, or religious legal orders as
objects of study. See, e.g., MARTIN CHANOCK, LAW, CUSTOM, AND SOCIAL ORDER: THE COLONIAL
EXPERIENCE IN MALAWI AND ZAMBIA (Jim Lance ed.,1998); Chanock, supra note 32; Fitzpatrick,
supra note 32; Strathern, supra note 32; Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC'Y REV.
869 (1988).
36 Law and development scholars examine developing states (as opposed to developing
communities) in Latin America, Eastern Europe or North Africa. See, e.g., Pistor, supra note 5;
Alvaro Santos, The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic Development, in
THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 253–300 (David Trubek &
Alvaro Santos eds., 2006); César Rodríguez-Garavito, Toward a Sociology of the Global Rule of
Law Field: Neoliberalism, Neoconstitutionalisms, and the Contest Over Judicial Reform in Latin
America, in LAWYERS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 156–83 (Yves Dezalay
& Bryant G. Garth eds., 2011).
37 I chose December 2010 as the date to end data collection to provide a clean cut off point. I was
also able to ensure I could access all the reported cases for that period, in case there was any
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sentencing circle at the sentencing phase, as well as outcomes on sentencing
after a sentencing circle was conducted. Part III proceeds within a framework
of lay participation in law, 38 arguing that the outcomes of incorporating these
procedures should be judged against the kinds of goals that normally
underlie lay and community participation in shaping sentences for convicted
offenders. In this view, the ambiguous results become less important than the
way those results were achieved.
The discussion in Part IV challenges legal intermediaries to address the
“transplant effect.” 39 It suggests that judges have tools that can be employed
to assess and process sentencing circle recommendations. 40 Lay participation
in sentencing has been all but eliminated in many jurisdictions—including
Canada—so the ultimate authority for sentencing defendants resides with
the judge. 41 Nevertheless, this Article suggests that where lay participation
and culture is instrumentalized, judges may need to employ the law’s
technical contributions. 42 The suggestion to use formalities or technical legal
approaches to distill Aboriginal procedures may seem odd. However, part of
this Articles’s is to query whether decoupling legal formalism from legal
techniques 43 might mediate the risks associated with instrumentalizing
normative and expressive goals.
delay between the decision and the reporting of the case. Admittedly, 2010 is an arbitrary cut off
point, but, as there have not been any significant changes to the Criminal Code or to the way
sentencing circles are being conducted, I have no reason to believe that the conclusions that I will
draw are in any way affected by this cut off point.
38

See Goldbach & Hans, supra note 26.

39

Berkowitz et al., supra note 6, at 167.

40

See infra Part IV.

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 720, s. 745, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 155; 1995 c. 22, s. 6;
2015, c. 13, s. 23. Sentencing proceedings are carried out by the court, except where a jury finds
an accused guilty of second degree murder, guilty of murder where the accused has a prior
conviction for murder, or where the accused was under the age of sixteen; in these cases, the
judge must give the jury the option to make a non-binding recommendation on the period the
accused is required to serve before being eligible for release on parole. See Neil Vidmar, The
Canadian Criminal Jury: Searching for a Middle Ground, 62 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 141, 148
(1999); Goldbach & Hans, supra note 26, at 2721.

41

42 See, e.g., Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels & Annelise Riles, From Multiculturalism to Technique:
Feminism, Culture, and the Conflict of Laws Style, 64 STAN. L. REV. 589, 594–95 (2012); Law as
Object, supra note 13, at 1026–27.

See ANNELISE RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE: LEGAL REASONING IN THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL
MARKETS 70–71 (2011) [hereinafter COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE] (arguing that an ethnography of
legal expertise must include a close examination “of the skill and the art, the aesthetics and the
bricolage, the satisfaction of rehearsing and perhaps innovating upon or adding to a set of moves
and postures one has observed, apprenticed, debated with other initiates,” which is
distinguishable from legal formalism, “the view that legal form constrains politics”); see also
VALVERDE, supra note 29, at 28 (distinguishing between socio-legal scholarship, which examines
the ways that law, formally applied, reproduces forms of power relations, and the study of the
“mechanisms” by which law produces or “constitutes” knowledge).
43
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II. COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW
A. Justice Studies 1967–1995
The Canadian government transplanted Aboriginal healing circles into
the Canadian criminal trial following a cross-national exercise that analyzed
Aboriginal confrontation with the criminal justice system using a
comparative law methodology. Starting from the position that the
relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the criminal justice system
needed to change, government sponsored inquires focused on the conflict
between justice values and principles by comparing Aboriginal and EuroCanadian approaches to crime. 44
Between 1967 and 1995, provincial and federal levels of government
sponsored more than thirty justice studies 45 regarding the causes and effects
of systemic discrimination against Aboriginal people. 46 For example, the Task
Force on the Criminal Justice System and its Impact on the Indian and Metis
People of Alberta assigned former Chief Judge of the Provincial Court,
Justice Allan Cawsey, a mandate “to complete a review of the criminal justice
system in Alberta as it relates to Indian and Metis people.” 47 The Alberta
Task Force combined submissions from law organizations, researchers, and
native groups with statistical data. Similarly, the Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples (“RCAP”) heard testimony at public hearings, accepted
submissions from organizations funded through an intervener participation
program, sponsored research studies, and organized national “round tables”
on Aboriginal issues, which brought together academics, practitioners,
politicians, and community leaders. 48
First, task forces, inquiries, and royal commissions sought to understand
why and how the criminal justice system negatively affected Aboriginal
Individual scholars also took on the task of investigating the conflicts between justice and
values. See, e.g., JAMES S. FRIDERES & RENÉ R. GADACZ, ABORIGINAL PEOPLES IN CANADA (7th ed.
2004); RUPERT ROSS, DANCING WITH A GHOST: EXPLORING INDIAN REALITY (1992).

44

Dara Culhane, Justice and Healing: Aboriginal Peoples in Canada, 6 J. HUM. JUST. 140, 151
(1995).

45

In addition to the reports and commissions cited in the text, see GOV’T OF CANADA ET AL.,
REFLECTING INDIAN CONCERNS AND VALUES IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM (1985); CHIEF JUSTICE T.
ALEXANDER HICKMAN ET AL., ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE DONALD MARSHALL, JR., PROSECUTION:
DIGEST OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1989); JUDGE PATRICIA LINN, FED’N OF SASK
INDIAN NATIONS ET AL., REPORT OF THE SASKATCHEWAN INDIAN JUSTICE REVIEW COMMITTEE
(1992); TASK FORCE ON FEDERALLY SENTENCED WOMEN, CREATING CHOICES: THE REPORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON FEDERALLY SENTENCED WOMEN (1990).
46

TASK FORCE ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INDIAN AND METIS
PEOPLE OF ALBERTA, JUSTICE ON TRIAL: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INDIAN AND METIS PEOPLE OF ALBERTA, 1-1 (1991).
47

48 James S. Frideres, The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: The Route to SelfGovernment?, 16 CAN. J. NATIVE STUD. 247, 247–53 (1996).
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offenders. 49 They examined feelings of alienation, as well as the
disproportionate representation of Aboriginal offenders in provincial and
federal prisons. 50 For example, RCAP’s comprehensive report found that, in
Saskatchewan, a treaty Indian boy of sixteen had a 70 percent chance of
serving a prison term by the age of twenty-five, while a non-Native
Saskatchewan boy only had an 8 percent chance. 51 Comparing populations
with penal statistics also illustrated the extent of over-incarceration. 52 In the
See, e.g., MINISTRY OF SOLICITOR GENERAL, OTTAWA (ONTARIO), supra note 16, at 23, 28; ALVIN
HAMILTON, A FEATHER, NOT A GAVEL: WORKING TOWARDS ABORIGINAL JUSTICE 49, 61 (2001)
(describing the efforts of the Aboriginal justice inquiry in Manitoba to learn about structural
impediments to justice and the particular discrimination in effect in Winnepeg: “Aboriginal city
residents . . . described their personal experiences with police brutality, the courts’ indifference
and the oppression of bigotry and discrimination . . . .”); see also Daniel Kwochka, Aboriginal
Injustice: Making Room for a Restorative Paradigm, 60 SASK. L. REV. 153, 154–55 (1996).
49

MINISTRY OF SOLICITOR GENERAL, OTTAWA (ONTARIO), supra note 16, at 5, 23; JAMES DUMONT,
JUSTICE AND ABORIGINAL PEOPLE 29–32 (1990) (examining the differences between Aboriginal
approaches to justice and “expectations of the legal system” in a paper written for the Public
Inquiry into the Administration of Justice and Aboriginal People. Practices common in the EuroCanadian legal system may seem “culturally and ethically foreign and opposing,” and
“[d]ifferences in value orientation causes [sic] significant differences in behavior, and where
Native people come into the legal context of the dominant society the situation appears to foster
behavioral conflicts within the courtroom as well as with enforcers of the law.”); Giokas, supra
note 16, at 187 (“Aboriginal over-representation is affirmed by report after report documenting
the high contact rates of Aboriginal people with police and their disproportionately high rates of
arrest, conviction and imprisonment. Over-representation in prisons and jails is now an
acknowledged fact, and there is every indication that the problem may be worsening, given that
the federal Aboriginal inmate population is increasing at more than twice the national rate.”);
Carol LaPrairie, The Role of Sentencing in the Over-Representation of Aboriginal People in
Correctional Institutions, 32 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 429, 429 (1990) (“For the
past two decades, virtually, everything written and discussed in the area of aboriginal people
and the criminal justice system has used as its starting point the over-representation of
aboriginal people as inmates in federal, provincial, and territorial correctional institutions.”).
50

51 William D. Coleman, Bridging the Cultural Divide: A Report on Aboriginal People and
Criminal Justice in Canada, 29 CAN. J. OF POL. SCI. 784, 785 (1996).

MINISTRY OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, OTTAWA (ONTARIO), supra note 16, at 5, 24; TASK FORCE
ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INDIAN AND METIS PEOPLE OF
ALBERTA (CANADA), supra note 47, at 6–4 (“It is a well known and historically persistent fact
52

that the Aboriginal peoples of Alberta have been dramatically and proportionately overrepresented in jails and penitentiaries. Task Force research has determined that, over the past
five years, the percentage of Aboriginals in jail has ranged from 29.7% to 31.5% for the total
Aboriginal population. For 1989, the most recent year, the percentage is 31.1% compared to a 4%
to 5% representation of the general population of Alberta.”); see also Tim Quigley, Are We Doing
Anything about the Disproportionate Jailing of Aboriginal People?, 42 CRIM. L.Q. 129, 157 (1999)
(noting the proportion of Aborignial offenders who are incarcerated rather than fined greatly
exceeds their population); LaPrairie, supra note 50, at 429 (“aboriginal people comprise
approximately 1.5–2% of the Canadian population but make up approximately 8–10% of the
federal correctional institutional population and considerably more in provincial and territorial
institutions . . . for certain aboriginal groups such as women and juveniles, the rates may be even
more extreme”); DEP’T OF JUSTICE CAN., FINAL EVALUATION ABORIGINAL JUSTICE STRATEGY 12
(2000),
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2007/jus/J3-6-2000-1E.pdf
[hereinafter
ABORIGINAL JUSTICE STRATEGY EVALUATION 2000] (“Aboriginal people continue to be
overrepresented among admissions to adult correctional facilities, as 15% of provincial/territorial
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early 1990s, Aboriginal people made up between 2–3 percent of the total
population of Canada, yet they made up 10–15 percent of the penitentiary
population. 53 In certain areas, the proportions may have been much higher.
In 1992, in the prairie provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta
Aboriginal people represented approximately 15 percent of the population,
but their percentage of total prison population might have been as high as 60
percent. 54
Initially, researchers attributed this over-incarceration of Aboriginal
offenders to high levels of crime and facially neutral policies that negatively
impacted Aboriginal offenders. 55 In particular, researchers blamed
sentencing practices for over-incarceration and Aboriginal offenders’ feelings
of alienation. 56 Carol LaPrairie, who worked as a researcher for the
Department of Justice, wrote:
admissions are Aboriginal peoples, while they represent 2.8% of the general Canadian
population . . . . The [Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics] reported that in 1997/98, the total
percentage of Aboriginal peoples sentenced to provincial/territorial probation was 12%—over
four times the proportion of Aboriginal people in the Canadian population.”); see generally, A. C.
HAMILTON & C. M. SINCLAIR, REPORT OF THE ABORIGINAL JUSTICE INQUIRY OF MANITOBA ch. 4
(1991).
POPULATION BY ABORIGINAL GROUPS AND SEX, SHOWING AGE GROUPS, FOR CANADA, 1996
CENSUS (20% SAMPLE DATA), STATS. CAN. CATALOG NO.
93F0025XDB96002,
www.statcan.gc.ca/c1996-r1996/jan13-13jan/c1996-r1996-eng.pdf (last visted Feb. 12, 2016);
CANADIAN CENTRE FOR JUSTICE STATISTICS PROFILE SERIES, ABORIGINAL PEOPLES IN CANADA
(2001); see ROYAL COMM’N ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND THE JUSTICE
SYSTEM 30, 41 (1993); R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, 719 (Can.) (“If overreliance upon
incarceration is a problem with the general population, it is of much greater concern in the
sentencing of aboriginal Canadians. In the mid-1980s, aboriginal people represented about 2
percent of the population of Canada, yet they made up 10 percent of the penitentiary population.
In Manitoba and Saskatchewan, aboriginal people constituted something between 6 and 7
percent of the population, yet in Manitoba they represented 46 percent of the provincial
admissions and in Saskatchewan 60 percent. The situation has not improved in recent years. By
1997, aboriginal peoples constituted closer to 3 percent of the population of Canada and
amounted to 12 percent of all federal inmates.”).
53

54

ROYAL COMM’N ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, supra note 53.

See, e.g., BRIDGING THE CULTURAL DIVIDE, supra note 16, at 41 (citing reports that found
Aboriginal offenders more likely than non-Aboriginals to plead guilty even when they do not
believe themselves to be guilty, and they were also less likely to benefit from plea bargains).

55

ROBERT A. SILVERMAN & MARIANNE O. NIELSEN, ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND CANADIAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 122–23 (Robert A. Silverman & Marianne O. Nielsen eds., 1992) (“Dealing
with courts means dealing with the central most important issue to Native people (or others)
who find themselves facing a conviction for a violation of criminal law—and that is sentencing.”
The Crown was less likely, in 1975, to offer a plea bargain to Aboriginal offenders and Aboriginal
“cultural traits” were misinterpreted, negatively impacting Aboriginal offenders); REPORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INDIAN AND METIS
PEOPLE OF ALBERTA, supra note 47, at 6-1 (reviewing submissions and statistical data on
recidivism and concluding that “the imposition and enforcement of sentences had very little
impact on Aboriginal persons.”); BRIDGING THE CULTURAL DIVIDE, supra note 16, at 309 (“The
Canadian criminal justice system has failed the Aboriginal peoples of Canada—First Nations,
Inuit and Metis people, on-reserve and off reserve, urban and rural—in all territorial and
56
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Nowhere else is the use of the criminal justice system to
address a major social and economic problem so potentially
problematic as it is in relation to [A]boriginal people. It is this
group which appears to be incarcerated for less serious
offences because its members do not qualify for probation, and
few options but incarceration are available to judges. 57
Ultimately, reports explained Aboriginal confrontation with the criminal
justice system as a conflict between two sets of justice values. 58 By comparing
Euro-Canadian and Aboriginal justice principles and approaches to crime,
inquiries revealed the extent to which the criminal justice system was alien
and oppressive to Aboriginal people. 59 For example, Judge Murray Sinclair,
Co-Commissioner of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, compared
Euro-Canadian punishment and deterrence approaches to Aboriginal justice
principles. While acknowledging that there was no universal Aboriginal
conception of justice, he explained an Aboriginal conception of justice “would
be that of restoring peace and equilibrium to the community through
reconciling the accused with his or her own conscience and with the
individual or family that [was] wronged.” 60 By comparison, Euro-Canadian
justice considers offenders to be harmful to society and punishes them in
order to deter harmful, deviant behavior by that offender and others in the
future. 61
governmental jurisdictions. The principal reason for this crushing failure is the fundamentally
different world views of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people with respect to such elemental
issues as the substantive content of Justice and the process of achieving Justice.”)
57

LaPrairie, supra note 50, at 437.

See, e.g., DUMONT, supra note 50, at 28; Leonard Mandamin, Aboriginal Justice Systems, in
ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 275, 281 (Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples eds., 1993) (“For Aboriginal people the emphasis is on restoration and healing rather
than punishment”); BRIDGING THE CULTURAL DIVIDE, supra note 16, at 309; Murray Sinclair,
Aboriginal Peoples, Justice and the Law, in CONTINUING POUNDMAKER AND RIEL’S QUEST: A
COMPILATION OF THE PRESENTATIONS MADE AT A CONFERENCE ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND
JUSTICE 178 (Richard Gosse et al. eds., 1994) (“. . . the question should be restated as: ‘What is
wrong with our justice system that Aboriginal people find it so alienating?’ . . . . [The starting
point] requires one to come to terms with the concept that Aboriginal Peoples of North America,
for the most part, hold world views and life philosophies fundamentally different from those of
the dominant Euro-Canadian society, and that these belief systems and approaches to life are so
fundamentally different as to be inherently in conflict.”); see generally REPORT OF THE TASK
FORCE ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INDIAN AND METIS PEOPLE OF
ALBERTA, supra note 47; HAMILTON & SINCLAIR, supra note 52, at ch. 2; see also Kwochka, supra
note 49, at 159–60.
58

59 See, e.g., DUMONT, supra note 50, at 32; MINISTRY OF SOLICITOR GENERAL, OTTAWA (ONTARIO),
supra note 16, at 28–31; BRIDGING THE CULTURAL DIVIDE, supra note 16, at 58 (“It is difficult
and disturbing to realize that Aboriginal people see the non-Aboriginal justice system as alien
and repressive, but the evidence permits no other conclusion.”).
60

Sinclair, supra note 58.

61

Id.

76

TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 25:61

In its position paper on incarceration, the Community Holistic Circle
Healing Program: Hollow Water First Nation, 62 also compared the two
approaches to justice as follows:
Our tradition, our culture, speaks clearly about the concepts
of judgement and punishment. They belong to the Creator.
They are not ours . . . . People who offend against another
(victimizers) are to be viewed and related to as people who are
out of balance—with themselves, their family, their
community, and their Creator. A return to balance can best be
accomplished through a process of accountability that
includes support from the community through teaching and
healing. The use of judgement and punishment actually
works against the healing process. An already unbalanced
person is moved further out of balance . . . .
The adversarial approach also places the victimizer against
his or her community. As we see it, this goes against the very
essence of the healing process. For us, healing (breaking the
cycle) is based on (1) the victimizer taking full responsibility
for his/her actions, (2) the victim understanding and
integrating this into day-to-day living, and (3) the
COMMUNITY being able to support, assist, and/or hold
accountable all the parties of the victimization. Until this can
happen, and as long as incarceration is seen as the solution,
the community will not be a safe place. 63
Because of these fundamentally different worldviews of justice,
Aboriginals participating in the non-Aboriginal justice system was itself an
experience of colonization. 64 Task forces and commissions found that
assuming greater responsibility for the delivery and administration of justice

The Hollow Water Initiative serves First Nation and Metis in four communities: Manigotagan,
Aghaming, Seymourville, and Hollow Water. For additional information about the Community
Holistic Circle Healing Program, see ED BULLER, ABORIGINAL COMMUNITY HEALING PROCESSES
IN CANADA 3–8 (2005).
62

63

THE CHURCH COUNCIL ON JUSTICE & CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at XXIII-XXV.

BRIDGING THE CULTURAL DIVIDE, supra note 16 (“In making the case for Aboriginal control of
‘Justice’, the RCAP begins by recognizing that [it] has been through the law and the
administration of justice that Aboriginal people have experienced the most repressive aspects of
colonialism. The RCAP then proposed that it is in Aboriginal law, with Aboriginal law and
through Aboriginal law that Aboriginal people aspire to regain control over their lives and
communities. The establishment of systems of Aboriginal justice is seen as a necessary part of
throwing off the suffocating mantle of a legal system imposed through colonialism.”). These
issues are examined more closely in Toby S. Goldbach, Sentencing Circles, Clashing Worldviews,
and the Case of Christopher Pauchay, 10 ILLUMINE: J. OF THE CTR. FOR STUD. IN RELIGION AND
SOC’Y GRADUATE STUDENTS ASS’N 53, 66–68 (2011).
64
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was imperative, and 65 most agreed that Aboriginal people possessed the legal
and constitutional authority to administer justice. 66 Canada identified two
options: (i) recognize the right to a separate parallel justice system for
Aboriginal people, or (ii) incorporate Aboriginal justice into the existing
criminal justice system. 67
B. Bridging the Gap
During the 1990s, Canadian authorities effectively transplanted
Aboriginal healing circles as “sentencing circles” into the criminal trial. This
alternative sentencing theory, and others, presented an attractive remedial
approach that recognized Aboriginal authority to administer justice. Since
Canadian criminal scholars and practitioners were already attacking the
foundations of deterrence and incarceration in response to crime, 68 Aboriginal
See COMMUNICATION DIVISION, MINISTRY OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, NATIVE PEOPLES AND
JUSTICE: REPORTS ON THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE AND THE FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL CONFERENCE
ON NATIVE PEOPLES AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 14–16, 25–26, 38 (1975) (explaining that
many of the reports and commissions attribute sentencing conflict to Aboriginal exclusion from
the design and delivery of justice services in Canada. It was at the National Conference on
Native Peoples and the Criminal Justice System that concern about Aboriginal experience was
first linked to Aboriginal exclusion from the design and delivery of justice services: “The
following guidelines . . . were regarded and adopted . . . as a statement of general philosophy
underlying any approach to the problems of natives within the criminal justice system. 1. Native
persons should be closely involved in the planning and delivery of services associated with
criminal justice and native peoples. 2. Native communities should have greater responsibility for
the delivery of criminal justice services to their people . . . .”).
65

See, e.g., BRIDGING THE CULTURAL DIVIDE, supra note 16; James C. MacPherson, Report from
the Round Table Rapporteur, in ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 1, 6 (“One of the
more promising themes of the Round Table was the absence of potential jurisdictional
impediments to reform in the justice area . . . most of the participants at the Round Table
appeared to agree with Patrick Macklem’s analysis in his paper dealing with the relationship
between the current constitutional framework in the justice field and new Aboriginal justice
systems. Professor Macklem stated, ‘In my view, neither the current distribution of legislative
authority nor the judicature provisions pose any serious impediment to the establishment of a
separate or parallel system of justice for Aboriginal people, although federal-provincial cooperation may be required to vest Aboriginal courts with jurisdiction over certain subject
matters.’”).
66

67 Giokas, supra note 16, at 201 (“The solutions most commonly discussed are a separate justice
system for aboriginal peoples, parallel systems or considerable accommodation within the
existing justice system.” Giokas argued that both projects “must be undertaken to eliminate
systemic discrimination . . . there must be movement on these two simultaneous projects:
developing internal community justice structures; and improving the overall justice system. The
latter can be accomplished on the basis of the many recommendations to this effect in the various
inquiry reports and can be begun on a unilateral basis by government. Both levels of government
have already started on this latter project, however haltingly, and will no doubt outline their
efforts to this Commission in another forum.”); ROYAL COMM’N ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, supra
note 53; see also SILVERMAN & NIELSEN, supra note 56.

See CANADIAN SENTENCING COMMISSION, SENTENCING REFORM: A CANADIAN APPROACH:
REPORT OF THE CANADIAN SENTENCING COMMISSION xxviii (1987) (Deterrence, rehabilitation,
and incapacitation “are clearly pragmatic,” nevertheless: “[e]vidence does not support the notion
68
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justice advocates could burrow themselves within the larger debates about
sentencing. Despite vast differences, law reformers, judges, and scholars
began to acknowledge parallels between “informal justice” approaches that
stressed communitarianism and interdependency, 69 and Aboriginal methods
for dealing with harm to the community.
Specifically, researchers pointed to the potential of restorative justice to
bridge the gap between Aboriginal and Euro-Canadian approaches to
sentencing. 70 Aboriginal and restorative justice approaches were seen as
overlapping in their goal to heal “the relationships that have been
jeopardized by the wrongdoer’s behavior.” 71 Given that North America,
Europe, Australia, and New Zealand had already begun to implement
restorative justice initiatives scholars, practitioners, and law reformers could
that variations in sanctions . . . affect the deterrent value of sentences. In other words,
deterrence cannot be used, with empirical justification, to guide the imposition of sentences.
There are no comprehensive data that support the idea that courts can . . . impose sanctions that
have a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitating offenders . . . .[And, the] extensive literature on
incapacitation suggests that as a crime-control strategy the costs of imprisonment far outweigh
the benefits achieved in reducing crime.”); STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE & SOLICITOR
GENERAL, TAKING RESPONSIBILITY: REPORT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND
SOLICITOR GENERAL ON ITS REVIEW OF SENTENCING, CONDITIONAL RELEASE AND RELATED
ASPECTS OF CORRECTIONS (1988); see also Julian V. Roberts, Sentencing in Canada: The Context
for Reform, 32 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 381 (1990) (summarizing federal
government initiatives, as well as the work of the Law Reform Commission of Canada, to
produce proposals for sentencing reform focused on the reduction of imprisonment); Anthony N.
Doob & Voula Marinos, Reconceptualizing Punishment: Understanding the Limitations on the
Use of Intermediate Sanctions, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 413, 417–21 (1993) (tracing the
movement to support non-prison forms of punishment by reviewing the history of federal
government initiatives to reform sentencing in Canada; and specifically noting statements by the
Canadian Sentencing Commission chair, “a former Royal Canadian Mounted Police officer
known for his far-right views on criminal justice matters, [which] stunned many observers by
explicitly rejecting . . . the view that increased imprisonment would reduce levels of crime in
Canadian society”).
69 Carol LaPrairie, Aboriginal Crime and Justice: Explaining the Present, Exploring the Future,
34 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 281, 282 (1992).

See, e.g., LAW COMM’N. OF CAN. & DENNIS COOLEY, FROM RESTORATIVE JUSTICE TO
TRANSFORMATIVE JUSTICE DISCUSSION PAPER (1999) (stating that a restorative justice
‘movement’ began in the early 1970s based on work done with two young offenders arrested for
vandalism in Kitchener, Ontario. Within the criminal justice system, restorative justice
frequently consisted of victim-offender reconciliation and family group conferences. Family
conferencing is an excellent example of why restorative justice and Aboriginal approaches to
justice should not be conflated. Family group conferencing relies on the family’s ability to evoke
shame and show disapproval, which contradicts certain Aboriginal culture and justice practices);
Kwochka, supra note 49, at 156 (arguing that recommendations to include Aboriginal
involvement in the design and delivery of justice services “having more recognition of Aboriginal
culture and law” are most promising “because they fit with a new and vibrant philosophy of
criminal justice . . . [which] involves a fundamentally different approach to the criminal justice
system that can be loosely characterized under the heading of ‘restorative justice.’”); Quigley,
supra note 52, at 144 (“Restorative justice is a throwback to the ways of dealing with wrongdoing
in many indigenous societies.”); Lilles, supra note 20.
70

71

Quigley, supra note 52, at 144.
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appeal to “culturally appropriate” programs within already existing
structures. 72 Eventually, perceptions about Aboriginal approaches to crime
converged with the idea of restorative justice. 73 For example, in a case
decided by the Supreme Court of Canada in February 2000, Justice Iacobucci,
on behalf of the Court, wrote: “most traditional [A]boriginal conceptions of
sentencing hold restorative justice to be the primary objective,” and their
“approaches place a primary emphasis on the goal of restorative justice.” 74
In 1996, Canadian lawmakers codified a broader movement away from
deterrence and incapacitation in new sentencing provisions of the Canadian
Criminal Code. 75 Thus, transplanted Aboriginal methods received legislative
support and increased exposure. Based on the recommendations of a Federal
Standing Committee on sentencing, the federal government enacted
sweeping changes to the Criminal Code, including new provisions expressly
articulating the purposes and principles of sentencing. Still in force, Section
718 outlines the purposes of sentencing for all offenders, including restorative
and reparative justice goals. 76 In addition to denunciation, deterrence, and
other traditional sentencing objectives, judges can also craft sanctions “to
promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the
harm done to victims or to the community.” 77 Section 718.2 introduces “other
sentencing principles,” which requires judges to take into account the goals of
predictability and ensures that the offender’s liberties are not deprived if less
restrictive measures are appropriate. 78 More pointedly, Section 718.2(e)

MINISTRY OF SOLICITOR GENERAL, OTTAWA (ONTARIO), supra note 16; see also LAW REFORM
COMMISSION OF CANADA, REPORT ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE EQUALITY,
RESPECT, AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE AS REQUESTED BY THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE UNDER
SUBSECTION 12(2) OF THE LAW REFORM COMMISSION ACT (1991) (stating that with “very little
adjustment,” restorative justice programs in place in Correctional Services would be able to
“incorporate customary law, thus increasing their acceptability to the affected population”). But
see Jennifer J. Llewellyn, Dealing with the Legacy of Native Residential School Abuse in Canada:
Litigation, ADR, and Restorative Justice, 52 U. TORONTO L. J. 253 (2002) (presenting an opposing
view).
72

Llewellyn, supra note 72; see, Lilles, supra note 20 (explaining the process of ‘circle sentencing’
as an example of a restorative justice initiative).

73

74

R. v. Wells, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 207, paras. 37–38 (Can.).

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, s. 718(e)–(f). In addition to the principles of deterrence and
denunciation, the criminal code states that “just sanctions” include the objectives of providing
reparations, and promoting a sense of responsibility in offenders and acknowledging harm done
to victims. The new sentencing provisions also introduced Alternative Measures (s. 717) and the
Conditional Sentence of Imprisonment (s. 742) as options for sentencing offenders. See discussion
of conditional sentencing infra note 80.
75

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, s. 718 (a)–(f) (stating that the objectives of sanctions
include: (a) denunciation, (b) deterrence, (c) removal, (d) rehabilitation, (e) reparations, and (f)
promoting a sense of responsibility in offenders).

76

77

Id. s. 718(f).

78

Id. s. 718.2(b), (d).
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mandates that judges consider all alternatives to imprisonment and give
“particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.” 79
Some judges were already conducting sentencing circles prior to these
amendments pursuant to their discretion. However, these amendments to the
Criminal Code gave judges legislative authority to transplant Aboriginal
practices into the criminal trial. 80 Courts held that the sentencing principles
delineated in Section 718.2(e) instruct judges to consider those sentencing
procedures that may be appropriate because of the offender’s Aboriginal
heritage. For example, in a case decided shortly after the new sentencing
provisions came into effect, Alberta Provincial Court Justice Marshall
interpreted 718.2(e) as providing the legal authority to conduct a sentencing
circle. Regarding the language “with particular attention to the
circumstances of Aboriginal offenders,” Justice Marshall wrote:
This suggests to me that additional tools that are unique to
[A]boriginal people such as sentencing circles, traditional
healing methods, respect for the advice of elders, etc., should
be utilized where reasonably possible and that special
recognition should be given to the native traditional way of
life, and the effects that the removal from that community,
and way of life, would have upon an [A]boriginal offender.
Such an approach, it is hoped, would make the justice system
more just, meaningful and acceptable to the aboriginal
people. 81
Considering the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders goes beyond
merely inquiring into the offender’s socio-economic circumstances. It also
requires a different approach and a willingness to address crime by utilizing
those additional tools, which include sentencing circles, that are available to
Aboriginal offenders as members of that community. 82
79 Id. s. 718.2 (“A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following
principles . . . (e) all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the
circumstances . . . should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the
circumstances . . . of Aboriginal offenders.”).

In addition to directing judges to consider express statements of the purposes and principles of
sentencing, the amendments to the Criminal Code introduced the conditional sentence of
imprisonment as a sentencing option. See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, s. 742.1
(explaining that if the offense is not subject to a mandatory minimum sentence and the final
sentence is for a period of less than two years, the judge can order a term of imprisonment to be
served in the community rather than in a correctional facility). Conditional sentences greatly
impact the use of sentencing circles in criminal trial by providing a framework and a form of
sentence for the types of recommendations that sentencing circles often craft. See infra Part
III.B.

80

81

R. v. R. (H.) (1997), 205 A.R. 226, para. 53 (Can. Alta. P.C.).

The Supreme Court of Canada had the opportunity to consider Section 718.2 (e) in Gladue, 1
S.C.R., and then shortly thereafter in Wells, 1 S.C.R. In Gladue, the Court noted the emergence

82
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During roughly the same period sentencing circles were being
transplanted into the criminal trial, the Aboriginal Justice Initiative (1991–
1996), and its successor, the Aboriginal Justice Strategy (1996–present),
provided a bureaucratic structure for Aboriginal justice programs. 83 The
federal government—in cooperation with Indian and Northern Affairs
Canada, the Privy Council Office, the former Office of the Solicitor General
(now Public Safety Canada), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police—
developed initiatives to foster programs that could “be the foundation of long
term administration of justice improvements within the framework of the
Canadian law for Aboriginal people.” 84 In partnership with provincial and
territorial governments, the federal government funded “community-based
justice programs” on a cost-sharing basis, which included sentencing circles,
training, and development related to justice programs. 85
of “innovative sentencing practices, such as healing and sentencing circles, and aboriginal
community council projects, which are available especially to [A]boriginal offenders.” 1 S.C.R. ¶
74. While it declined to discuss sentencing circles in detail, the Court did write that “[t]he
background considerations regarding the distinct situation of [A]boriginal peoples in Canada”
included “[t]he types of sentencing procedures and sanctions which may be appropriate in the
circumstances for the offender because of his or her particular aboriginal heritage or connection.”
Id. ¶ 66.
DEPT. OF JUSTICE CAN., ABORIGINAL JUSTICE STRATEGY EVALUATION FINAL REPORT (2011)
[hereinafter ABORIGINAL JUSTICE STRATEGY EVALUATION 2011]; DON CLAIRMONT & JANE
MCMILLAN, DIRECTIONS IN MI’KMAQ JUSTICE: AN EVALUATION OF THE MI’KMAQ JUSTICE
INSTITUTE AND ITS AFTERMATH 12–13 (2001) (describing the Aboriginal Justice Directorate’s
(“AJD”) emphasis on restorative justice and community justice committees: “The major emphasis
of the [Aboriginal Justice Learning] Network [an initiative of the AJD] has been on restorative
justice, linking aboriginal traditions and preferences (e.g., circle sentencing) with new
developments such as family group conferencing.”).
83

84

ABORIGINAL JUSTICE STRATEGY EVALUATION 2000, supra note 52, at i.

ABORIGINAL JUSTICE STRATEGY EVALUATION 2011, supra note 83, at 5. The government also
funded program development for communities that did not have Aboriginal Justice Strategy
funded programs. Id. Since 1996, the Aboriginal Justice Strategy has been renewed twice for five
year mandates. Id. at 5. In 2006–07, the fund supported approximately 100 programs. Id. at 5.
By 2011–12, it funded 214 community programs. Id. In fiscal year 2013–2014, the federal
government spent $11 million funding the Aboriginal Justice Strategy, with a total commitment
to provide $22.2 million over two years. Aboriginal Justice Strategy, CANADA’S ECON. ACTION
PLAN, http://actionplan.gc.ca/en/initiative/aboriginal-justice-strategy (last visited Dec. 16, 2015).
Aboriginal Justice Strategy funded “Community Justice Committees” that often arrange
sentencing circles; they may specify procedures to be followed prior to, and at the sentencing
circle, make decisions about who participates in the circle, and may also identify a local
community leader to act as keeper of the circle. See generally ABORIGINAL JUSTICE STRATEGY
EVALUATION 2000, supra note 52, app. A. For example, the Yukon Tribal Council Community
Based Justice Initiative developed protocols and guidelines for sentencing circles, and the Elders
Panel of the Waywayseecappo Aboriginal Justice Program sits with the provincial court and
offers recommendations on sentencing. Id. at 81, 92. See also R. v. Johns (J.C.), [1995]
B.C.W.L.D. 299, para. 9 (Can. Y.K.C.A.) (describing the application process to the Kwanlin Dun
Community Justice Committee for a sentencing circle, and the process to set up a rehabilitation
program before the sentencing circle is held); R. v. Craft, [2006] Y.K.T.C. 19, paras. 30–31 (Can.);
R. v. Van Bibber, [2010] Y.K.T.C. 49, para. 31 (Can.) (noting the role of the Northern Tutchone
Council, also funded by the Department of Justice through the Aboriginal Courtwork Program,
85
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III. SENTENCING CIRCLE OUTCOMES
A. Sentencing Circles in the Criminal Trial
Following standard comparative law and legal transplant methodology, 86
this Part examines the effects of importing Aboriginal healing circles into the
sentencing phase of the criminal trial. This section presents data compiled
from a review of all adult criminal trials and appeals dealing with sentencing
circles to see how the reforms operate in action and to what extent the system
is receptive to the new legal transplant. 87
Before presenting this data, this Article introduces the issues and
concerns via a difficult, but emblematic, case. The facts are as follows.
Sometime between midnight and 5:00 AM, a father lost his two daughters in
the field by his house. 88 He was attempting to cross the field to get to his
brother-in-law’s house to find help for his youngest daughter who he thought
was hurt. 89 “Both girls died of hypothermia.” 90 The father “pled guilty to
criminal negligence” causing death. 91 At trial, he asked for a sentencing circle
to be held. 92 The court granted the request, held the sentencing circle, and
then delivered the sentence, which included a three-year prison term in a
federal penitentiary. 93
The level of controversy and vitriol around the judge’s decision to hold the
sentencing circle was robust. One reporter likened a sentencing circle to “a
group hug for both victims and offenders.” 94 Another intimated that given the
chance, the sentencing circle’s recommendation to the defendant would be to
“go stand outside in a snowbank until you’re a Popsicle.” 95 Against these
in conducting the sentencing circle); see also, STUART, supra note 19, at 33; Clairmont, supra
note 16, at 131–146 (discussing the Indian Brook justice initiative in Nova Scotia in comparison
to Aboriginal justice programs in Northern Ontario and Metropolitan Toronto).
Lasser, supra note 33; Michele Graziadei, The Functionalist Heritage, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL
STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 100 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003);
Langer, supra note 8.
86

87

Berkowitz et al., supra note 6.

88

R. v. Pauchay (2009), 328 Sask. R. 173, paras. 14–18 (Can. Sask. P.C.).

89

Id. ¶ 18.

90

Id. ¶ 17.

91

Id. ¶ 1.

92

Id.

R. v. Pauchay (2009), 333 Sask. R. 167, paras. 1, 69 (Can. Sask. P.C.) [hereinafter R. v.
Pauchay (II)].
93

94 Kevin Libin, Sentencing Circles for Aboriginals: Good Justice?, NAT’L POST (Feb. 27, 2009, 8:01
PM), http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=1337495.

Colby Cosh, Squaring the Circle on Justice, NAT’L POST (Nov. 7, 2008),
http://www.nationalpost.com/opinion/story.html?id=4252cc77-d93f-4749-a757-fd54fe8fd229.

95
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protestations stands the amount of time and effort the community expended.
Twenty-three people participated in an inner circle including: the victims’
mother, two members of the community who sat as surrogates for the
victims, the defendant’s parents, senior elders from Sturgeon Lake First
Nation and the Yellow Quill First Nation, interpreters, the judge, and other
justice representatives. 96 Another fifty to sixty people observed. 97 The circle
met for five hours. In advance of the sentencing circle, member of the reserve
spent additional time in healing circles held by the defendant’s family. 98 In
addition, a mental health specialist conducted interviews to prepare an
intervention strategy. 99
The participants made various recommendations. For example, the
mental health specialist recommended intervention strategies, such as
workshops to teach parenting and life skills, mentoring programs for youths,
and a helpline for children. 100 A community elder recommended that
defendant serve the elders, acting as a cultural helper and assisting with
ceremonial duties, such as setting up rocks for sweat lodges and filling and
lighting pipes before ceremonies. 101 The defendant would be required to
abstain from alcohol and drugs while in that role and would receive guidance
from the elders. 102 The role would be for life and serve as “a reminder that
the Creator had not left him.” 103
When he announced the decision, the judge thanked the participants,
noting that the sentencing circle had given him “valuable insight” into the
community’s views of the problems it faces. 104 The judge, however, noted that
he did not have the authority to order something that would amount to
probation for more than three years. 105 His decision was that a proper
balancing of the sentencing principles required incarceration for three

96

R. v. Pauchay (II), supra note 93, para. 47.

97

Goldbach et al., supra note 8, at 56.

98

Id.

99

Id. at 59; R. v. Pauchay (II), supra note 93, para. 48.

Goldbach et al., supra note 8, at 59; R. v. Pauchay (II), supra note 93, para. 48 (providing a
statement by the court regarding the recommendations made by the mental health specialist:
“Dr. Raj Hathiramani, the mental health therapist at Yellow Quill First Nation, provided a
comprehensive community healing plan that contained twelve specific recommendations, some
that were designed to address community issues well beyond the scope of the Sentencing Circle”).
For a discussion on judicial recitation of sentencing circle recommendations see infra Part IV.
100

101

R. v. Pauchay (II), supra note 93, para. 51.

102

Goldbach et al., supra note 8, at 57.

103

R. v. Pauchay (II), supra note 93, para. 51.

104

Id. ¶ 53.

105

Id. ¶ 69.
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years. 106 He wrote that it would be up to Mr. Pauchay, following his
incarceration, to decide whether he wanted the support of the Yellow Quill
First Nation. 107
It seemed everyone did everything right; an alternative, culturally
appropriate process was used and the judge engaged in the proper legal
analysis. Yet, because so many people spent so much time to work on
recommendations—only to have the judge say “thank you”—one can easily
find themselves frustrated and perturbed when reading the case. Again juries
are generally not involved in sentencing in Canada, but once we do involve
the community and ask them to participate, is there any duty on the judge to
adopt any part of the sentencing recommendations or to consider them in a
particular way?
B. Requests for Sentencing Circles
Taking a macro view, what follows is a review of the treatment of
sentencing circles in all cases where judges considered them during the
course of an adult criminal trial under the Canadian Criminal Code. 108 A
search for the phrase “sentencing circle” and “circle sentencing” generated
103 distinct hits. 109 These 103 hits included motions, final declarations or
dispositions on sentencing, appellate level decisions of cases relating to
sentencing circles, as well as cases that referred to the sentencing circle
process, but where sentencing circles were not actually conducted in the trial.
The cases were initially divided according to whether they related to
requests for sentencing circles, trials where sentencing circles were held, or
cases where the parties appealed. Appeals could consist of reviews of
decisions of whether to hold a sentencing circle, or reviews of the sentence
106

Id.

107

Id.

This will capture all published criminal trial decisions in Canada. Through online databases,
such as LexisNexis, Quicklaw, and the Canadian Legal Information Institute (“CanLII”),
Canadian courts publish all judgments on criminal code matters, including appellate decisions
and decisions of lower and higher court judges who are provincially and federally appointed,
respectively. What this does not include are cases that are diverted from the criminal justice
system, and young offenders who may go through the sentencing circle process, but whose
decisions remain unpublished. Therefore, there will be an amount of activity that is not covered
by this review. However, in so far as the reforms were meant to provide Aboriginal communities
with authority over the design and delivery of justice services, implementation and outcomes
within the adult criminal trials provide highly relevant information.
108

The initial search did not yield R. v. Moses, [1992] B.C.W.L.D. 1293 (Can. Y.K.T.C.). The judge
in that case, Territorial Court Judge Stuart, only used the terms “circle process” or “circle
discussions.” Moses, [1992] 71 C.C.C., paras. 81, 86, 100, 103, 110, 113, 169. The data presented
in this Article includes R. v. Moses because it is widely acknowledged as the first case where this
process was used. The data includes the first case and reflects the transition in judicial discourse
towards referring to the process as “circle sentencing” or a “sentencing circle.”
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itself when a sentencing circle was held. Of the cases that were reviewed,
there were forty-eight cases in which a request for a sentencing circle was
made to a judge. 110 Of the forty-eight cases in which a defendant made a
request before a judge to hold a sentencing circle, judges allowed a circle to be
held in thirty-seven cases. 111 The table below indicates the number of
requests for sentencing circles per year.
Table 1: Did the judge allow a request for a sentencing circle? (19922010)
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

Yes

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

0

No

Viewed in the aggregate, the data seems to indicate that judges were
favorable to allowing sentencing circles. However, the data looks different
when focusing on reported decisions in which the judge actually considered
the request as a motion on the merits. Of the sixteen cases where the request
110 These forty-eight cases include decisions in which the judge documented the disposition on a
formal application to the court in a distinct decision, as well as cases where a disposition was
inferred from reported sentencing decisions or appellate level decisions. In some of the decisions,
the court had already held a sentencing circle and the trial judge delivered the sentence. In those
cases, either the Crown consented to the request for a sentencing circle or the judge held a
hearing but did not write reasons regarding the request. See, e.g., R. v. Kahypeasewat (2006),
284 Sask. R. 55, paras. 62–66 (Can. Sask. P.C.) (court held a sentencing circle; judge only wrote
reasons for the final decision on sentencing). The Crown consented to the holding of a sentencing
circle in R. v. Manyfingers (C.J.) (1996), 191 A.R. 342 (Can. Alta. P.C.); R. v. Paul (D.) (1998), 203
N.B.R. 2d 243 (Can. N.B.P.C.); and R. v. Brooks, [2008] N.S.P.C. 58 (Can.). The data tabulating
requests for sentencing circles is presented in Appendix A of this Article.
111

For the full list of cases, see Appendix A.
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was contested, or the judge considered it as a motion on the merits and wrote
reasons for the decision, judges denied eleven of the requests for a sentencing
circle. 112 In three cases, the judge held a hearing or discussed reasons for
allowing a sentencing circle even though the Crown already consented. 113
The table below shows no discernible trend in the number of requests
allowed over the examined period, which suggest consistency in judicial
attitudes towards conducting sentencing circles. Although, there was a
considerable decline in requests for sentencing circles between 1998 and
2004, which may be the result of unfavorable decisions in early appeals of
trials that implemented sentencing circles. 114
In all jurisdictions, judges developed criteria to consider in determining
whether a particular case was appropriate for a sentencing circle. In
Saskatchewan, trial courts consider seven criteria, which were originally
articulated by Provincial Judge Fafard in R. v. Joseyounen. 115 British
Columbia trial courts adopted these seven criteria, 116 whereas the
Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal reviewed the criteria and
adopted five of the seven factors for their courts. 117 The relevant factors that
judges consider when determining whether to allow a sentencing circle
present similar themes, especially with regard to issues relating to the
accused, the victim, and the community’s participation. The table below
amalgamates the criteria, which appear across all provinces, and identifies

112

See Appendix A.

113R.

v. Nicholas (B.L.) (1996), 177 N.B.R. 2d 124 (Can. N.B.P.C.); Paul (D.), 203 N.B.R. 2d 243;
Brooks, [2008] N.S.P.C. 58, para. 2 (referring to principles set out in R. v. J. (J.) (2004), 244 Nfld.
& P.E.I.R. 24 (Can. Nfld. & Lab. C.A.) on whether to allow a request for a sentencing circle,
however, the Court indicates that the Crown’s consent made it unnecessary to determine the
issue of the request); see also R. v. Stick (C.) (2001), 202 Sask. R. 306, para. 10 (Can. Sask. Q.B.)
(stating that, on appeal, the court determined that the trial court judge erred by reversing his
prior decision to allow a sentencing circle without hearing submissions from the parties).
114 Luke McNamara, Appellate Court Scrutiny of Circle Sentencing, 27 MANITOBA L.J. 209, 225
(2000).
115 R. v. Joseyounen, [1995] 6 W.W.R. 438 (Can. Sask. P.C.). The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
approved Fafard’s criteria in R. v. Morin (I.) (1995), 134 Sask. R. 120 (Can. Sask. C.A.), and then
again in R. v. Munson (2001), 214 Sask. R. 26 (Can. Sask. Q.B.). The seven criteria are: (1) the
accused must agree to be referred to the sentencing circle; (2) the accused must have deep roots
in the community; (3) there are elders or respected non-political community leaders willing to
participate; (4) the victim is willing to participate and has been subjected to no coercion or
pressure; (5) the victim has counseling made available and is accompanied by a support team if
she has battered spouse syndrome; (6) disputed facts have been resolved in advance; and, (7) the
Court is willing to depart from the usual range of sentencing.
116

R. v. Pena (M. J.) (1997),148 D.L.R. 4th 372 (Can. B.C.S.C.).

117

J. (J.), 244 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 24; see also STUART, supra note 19.
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which factors were considered when denying a request for a sentencing
circle. 118
Table 2: Which factors were considered in denying a request for a
sentencing circle?
Factors to consider in
allowing/denying request for
sentencing circle

# of times
referred to as
reason for
denying request

Province and
Court, 119 Year
of Decision

Accused does not appear to have
accepted responsibility

2

BC SC, 1997
SK QB, 2001

Court is not willing to take a
calculated risk

3

SK QB, 1993
SK PC, 2006
SK QB, 2009

Accused does not have deep
roots in community

2

SK QB, 1993
BC SC, 1997

Community is not willing to
participate

3

BC CA, 2001
SK QB, 2001
BC PC, 2004

Victim is not willing to
participate

3

NF SC, 1994
SK CA, 2004
SK QB, 2009

Other 120

3

BC SC, 1997
SK QB, 2001
SK QB, 2005

118 Joseyounen, [1995] 6 W.W.R. 438 (demonstrating Judge Fafard’s criteria and factors were
delineated by Judge Grotsky in R. v. Cheekinew (1993), 108 Sask. R. 114 (Can. Sask. Q.B.), but it
does not include Fafard’s factors regarding whether the facts were agreed upon and whether the
accused agreed to be referred to a sentencing circle, as there were no cases that were denied for
these reasons. A more appropriate or accurate way to deal with issues involving the accused is to
query whether the accused sufficiently accepted responsibility for his or her actions before
involving the victim and the community in a joint process).
119 Court of Appeal (“CA”) and Superior Court (“SC”) are higher-level courts with federally
appointed judges, and Provincial Court (“PC”), is a lower level trial court with provincially
appointed judges.
120 Other reasons for denying a request for a sentencing circle included: concern that the
discussion was going to be outside the normal scope of sentencing circles and about the charge
rather than about the accused, see R. v. Stick (C.) (2001), 202 Sask. R. 306 (Can. Sask. Q.B.);
concern that it was not appropriate to sever sentencing processes, see Pena (M.J.), 148 D.L.R.
4th 372; and, concern that the victims were numerous and the community was divided in support
or anger of the multiple accused, see R. v. Gopher (2005), 270 Sask. R. 175 (Can. Sask. Q.B.).
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Judges across each province apply tests or criteria to determine whether
a sentencing circle is appropriate in a particular case. 121 The list of factors for
the tests or criteria were developed and modified as individual judges
referred to similar judicial action in other provinces. 122 It should also be
noted that in the Newfoundland and Labrador case referred to above, 123 the
Court of Appeal went out of its way to identify that the trial judge’s mistake
was not the decision to allow a sentencing circle, rather, the judge failed to
consider whether the relevant criteria was met. 124 The appellate court
concluded that the trial judge erred:
not because he used a sentencing circle. (That may or may not
have been an appropriate decision in the exercise of his
discretion.) He did so, rather, because there were relevant
factors that he should have considered, but that he did not
(or, at least, there is no record of his ever having considered
them). 125
C. Sentencing Circle Recommendations
Once the trial judge allows a sentencing circle, the court will adjourn for
a period of time to allow for necessary preparations. 126 Participants who
121 Judges in Yukon, Ontario, and Alberta considered similar criteria to those laid out by judges
from Saskatchewan, British Columbia, Newfoundland and Labrador. See supra notes 114–120;
see, e.g., R. v. Manyfingers (C.J.) (1996), 191 A.R. 342, paras. 125–27 (Can. Alta. P.C.) (reviewing
the Saskatchewan and British Columbia tests and holding that “[n]o matter what procedure is
followed, it must be based on high legal standards”); R. v. L. (B.) (2002), 266 W.A.C. 78, paras. 7,
39–53 (Can. Alta. C.A.) (finding that the trial judge erred by not dealing with disputed facts as to
the extent of the defendant’s involvement in the crime prior to conducting the sentencing circle,
and noting that (i) there were no members of the community present that were not related to the
accused, and (ii) the victim’s wife, who was the victim of the crime, was not presnet because of
her condition). Yukon courts have fewer published decisions at the request stage, but decisions
on sentencing indicate that the court considered: the defendant’s voluntary participation;
community support; participation of the victim; and the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility
See R. v. Van Bibber, [2010] Y.K.T.C. 49, para. 78 (Can.); R. v. Craft, [2006] Y.K.T.C. 19, para.
31 (Can.).
122

See supra notes 114–118.

123

See R. v. J. (J.) (2004), 244 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 24, para. 1 (Can. Nfld. & Lab. C.A.).

Specifically, the court points to the following criteria “to be used in deciding whether or not a
sentencing circle should be used: (1) Willingness and Suitability of the Convicted Person . . . (2)
Willingness of the Victim (Freely Given) . . . (3) Willingness of the Community to Participate . . .
[and] (4) Whether the Offence Required a Term of Imprisonment.” Id. ¶ 73. The court held that
the judge failed to adequately consider three of these four criteria. Id.
124

125

Id. ¶ 74.

See, e.g., R. v. Morris, [2004] B.C.W.L.D. 807, paras. 1, 25 (Can. B.C.C.A.) (reporting that the
defendant pled guilty on July 22, 2003, and the sentencing circle was held on February 13, 2004);
R. v. Nicholas (B.L.) (1996), 177 N.B.R. 2d 124 , paras. 1–3 (Can. N.B.P.C.) (reporting that the
defendant pled guilty on January 8, 1996, and the sentencing circle was held on March 25, 1996);
R. v. Pauchay (2009), 328 Sask. R. 173 (Can. Sask. P.C.); R. v. Pauchay (2009), 333 Sask. R. 167
126
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normally appear during the sentencing phase of the trial, including the
defendant, defense counsel, the Crown, the police, social workers, and the
judge, also participate in the sentencing circle. 127 Additionally, the victim and
members of his or her family, as well as members of the defendant’s family
and other members of the community will also be present. 128 Talking about
the crime and its impact is meant to be an educational experience, where the
defendant learns about why and how his or her actions had a negative
impact. 129 It is also an opportunity for participants to discuss larger socioeconomic issues facing the community. 130 At the conclusion, the circle will
present recommendations for sentencing to the judge. 131 The court adjourns
for final submissions, and then the judge delivers the sentence.
(Can. Sask. P.C.) (stating that the request for the sentencing circle was granted on January 7,
2009, the circle was held on February 13, 2009, and the Crown and defense counsel made final
submissions on sentencing on March 4, 2009); R. v. Kahypeasewat (2006), 284 Sask. R. 55 (Can.
Sask. P.C.) (“The accused plead guilty to manslaughter on September 26, 2005. In May 2006, a
sentencing circle was held.”). Pre-sentencing reports are also prepared in the interim. But see R.
v. Johns (J.C.), [1995] B.C.W.L.D. 2996 (Can. Y.K.C.A.) (stating that preparations for the
sentencing circle were done before the conviction phase and that “[b]y the time Mr. Johns
attended court to plead guilty and to be sentenced, he had completed a 30 day residential alcohol
treatment program in Cardston, Alberta and had been sober for eight months.”).
127 STUART, supra note 19, at 48–51 (discussing the role of court personnel before and during the
sentencing circle); Lilles, supra note 20, at 81–82 (noting that at the beginning of the proceedings
the charges are read, and Crown and defense counsel will make brief opening statements).

See, e.g., R. v. Craft, [2006] Y.K.T.C. 19, para. 33 (Can.) (noting that the sentencing circle “was
conducted on two separate days. Thirty people were present on the first day, February 6, 2006,
including three of the victims in the car driven by Jodie MacMillan, her father and the parents of
the third person, Ainslinn Cornett. A number of their close friends were also in the Circle
supporting them. Twenty people were in the Circle on the second day, April 19, 2006, including
the victims and/or their family members.”); R. v. Poker (2006), 261 Nfld. & P.E.I.R., para. 54
(Can. Nfld. & Lab. T.D.) (“There were twenty participants in the circle which was under the
direction of Mr. Apenam Pone as the Circle Keeper and a well-respected Innu man in his own
right as counsellor for the Innu people of Sheshatshiu.”); see also Lilles, supra note 20, at 81
(estimating that between fifteen and fifty people usually attend the sentencing circle); STUART,
supra note 19, at 45 (discussing the importance of pre-circle preparation).
128

Lilles, supra note 20, at 84; STUART, supra note 19, at 9, 86 (“All the circumstances of the
offender, victim, and offence are examined to understand the underlying causes of the crime in
order to appreciate what relationships must be healed and strengthened—and called upon in
developing a healing plan.”).

129

130 See, e.g., Craft, [2006] Y.K.T.C. 19, para. 35 (stating that participants discussed “the
frequency of drinking and driving in the Yukon and how people driving to and from work are at
risk.”); R. v. Kahypeasewat, 284 Sask. R., ¶ 62 (noting that the circle discussed “the dynamic of
the offence”); Lilles, supra note 20, at 81 (stating that topics at a sentencing circle often include:
“[t]he extent of similar crimes within the community; [t]he underlying cause of such crimes; [a]
retrospective analysis of what life in the community had been before crime became so prevalent;
[t]he impact of these sorts of crimes on victims generally, on families and community life . . . .”)
(ellipses removed).
131 See, e.g., R. v. J. (J.) (2004), 244 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 24, para. 2 (Can. Nfld. & Lab. C.A.) (“It was
the recommendation of the Sentencing Circle that Mr. Poker be permitted to serve whatever is
left of his sentence in the Community of Natuashish under the direction of the counsellors there .
. . and with the help of the elders that they would offer whatever assistance they could to get Mr.
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It is important to analyze how judges treat sentencing circle
recommendations in the final sentencing decision. With respect to the cases
discussed in this Article, judges accepted the recommendations of sentencing
circles in eighteen of the thirty-seven reported cases. 132 However, in seven of
those cases, the Crown successfully reversed the sentence on appeal. 133 The
table below shows the number of sentencing circle recommendations from
1992 to 2010. During this span, trial judges accepted recommendations in
eighteen cases and explicitly rejected them in seven cases.

Poker back on track again.”); R. v. Taylor (1995), 132 Sask. R. 221, para. 1 (Can. Sask. Q.B.)
(noting that the “consensus” of the community participants “was that Taylor should be banished
to an island for the period of one year and if he completes this period of banishment then he
should be put on probation for three years with conditions that he attend a program on sexual
abuse, anger management and alcoholism and that he would not have contact with the victim for
a period of three years from the commencement of the probation); R. v. Paul (D.) (1998), 203
N.B.R. 2d 243, para. 15 (Can. N.B.P.C.) (noting that the court delivered the sentence, after
considering “all relevant principles and the concerns and recommendations of the circle,” which
included banishment); R. v. Elliot, [2006] A.B.P.C. 372, para. 34 (Can. Alta. P.C.) (noting that the
sentencing circle recommendations “were presented to the court to assist the court in
sentencing.”). But see R. v. Morris, [2004] B.C.W.L.D. 807, paras. 25, 75–76 (Can. B.C.C.A)
(noting that because of the victim’s concerns, “the circle proceeded more as a broad discussion of
themes than for the specific purpose of formulating recommendations for sentencing . . . .” But,
the court later notes that the trial judge’s conditions for probation, namely “hosting a potlatch;
organizing a Man's Talking and Sharing Circle; and completing the community service hours . . .
parallel the recommendations which emerged from the talking circle held on 13 February 2004 . .
. .”); Kahypeasewat, 284 Sask. R. 55, para. 62 (stating that participants at the sentencing circle
“were given an opportunity to provide input into sentencing options”).
132

See infra Appendix B for cases where sentencing circles were held, by case, year, and court.

In total, the Crown appealed over one third of the cases—seventeen out of forty-seven—in
which sentencing circles were requested or held. Defense council appealed only one out of
eighteen circle sentences. Moreover, the Crown succeeded in thirteen of its seventeen appeals.
133
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A troubling statistic remains that the status in twelve of the thirty-seven
cases in which sentencing circles were held and recommendations given are
unknown. In these twelve decisions, the trial judge neither specified the
nature of the recommendations made by the sentencing circle participants,
nor whether the recommendations were followed. In some cases, the judge did
impose a conditional sentence, which may indicate that the judge accepted
the circle’s recommendations, 134 although such acceptance is impossible to
confirm. The chart below revises the data in Table 3 to include decisions that
do not discuss the specific recommendations made by sentencing circle
participants.
Table 4: Did the Judge
Recommendations [Revised]?

Accept
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4
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2
1

134

See discussion supra note 80.

0

Yes
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Canadian criminal procedure does not require judges to disclose the
details of pre-sentencing information in their sentencing decisions. 135
Consequently, in the twelve cases where the trial judge did not note the
details of the recommendations, the judge may have treated sentencing circle
recommendations in the same manner as other pre-sentencing
information. 136 On the other hand, there were several instances where judges
treated sentencing circle recommendations quite differently from presentencing reports or information. 137 For example, in R. v. Labelle (B.), the
judge dealt with the sentencing circle recommendations as if they were part
of a negotiated agreement that would become valid once endorsed by the
court. 138
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Debates in Comparative Law
In Part III we saw that there was a transplant effect, especially at the
final sentencing stage, where judges were unsure what to do with sentencing
circle recommendations. 139 Why does this matter? How is this case different
from any other legal problem where there is a transplant effect? This Article
proposes that there is a difference when the transplant is undertaken not
only because it represents best practices, but also because those best
practices represent cultural and humanistic goals. Furthermore, this Article
argues that there are increased risks when normative and cultural
expressions are instrumentalized. This occurs when the expressive genre of
law, which attempts to reflect the world, is used as an instrument, 140 and,
when this happens, its implementation, outcomes, and transplant effects
must be examined.
To examine the instrumental value of sentencing circles within the
Aboriginal culture it is important to evaluate scholarship in comparative law.
Wigmore, a legal scholar in the area, defines comparative law as “the tracing

135

Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46 ss 721–726.2 (Can.).

In fact, in some decisions, the judge expressly likened the circle’s recommendations to
information or reports, which are submitted to the court at, or prior, to sentencing. See, e.g., R. v.
Naappaluk (1993), 25 C.R. 4th 220 (Can. C.Q.); R. v. Brooks (2008), 331 N.B.R. 2d 268, paras. 9–
11 (N.B.C.A.); R. v. Craft, [2006] Y.K.T.C. 19, para. 13 (Can.) (noting in an opinion written by
Judge Heino Lilles regarding the sentencing circle as comparable to a victim impact statement).
136

137 In the same case where he compared the sentencing circle process to a victim impact
statement, Judge Lilles’ remarks seemed to imply that the sentencing circle was actually
deliberating on an appropriate sentence. See Craft, [2006] Y.K.T.C. 19, para. 61. That decision
reads more like a judicial review than a distinct sentencing process.
138

R. v. L. (B.) (2002), 266 W.A.C. 78, (Can. Alta. C.A.).

139

Berkowitz et al., supra note 6, at 175–76.

140

Taking on the Technicalities, supra note 12, at 1027–28.
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of an identical or similar idea or institution through all or many [legal]
systems, with a view to discovering its differences and likenesses in various
systems, the reasons for those variations, and the nature and limits of the
inherent and invariable idea . . . .” 141 However, Wigmore does not ask to what
objective are comparisons made—to acquire a body of knowledge or map legal
traditions? 142 What exactly do we compare when we engage in an exercise of
comparative law? 143
Comparative law scholars compare legal systems that face the same,
universal problems. 144 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz wrote that the
purpose of comparative investigations is always functional and
instrumental, 145 while particular legal institutions and different laws are
meant to solve social problems that are similar among these institution. 146
Thus, comparative law allows scholars to discover the best practices, of both
legal rules and institutions, which one legal system can transplant to
another. 147 Comparative law scholars also consider functionality when
deciding which laws to compare because, “incomparables” cannot
productively be contrasted while “those which fulfill the same function” can
be. 148
According to these “social purpose functionalists,” 149 functionally
equivalent legal institutions are transported between legal systems for their
improvement. The view that imported legal institutions address social,
economic, or political goals is solidly entrenched in a broader history of
thinking that views law as a tool and society as a site that needs fixing. 150
141 John H. Wigmore, Comparative Law: Jottings on Comparative Legal Ideas and Institutions, 6
TUL. L. REV. 48, 51 (1932).
142 Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the
Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 671, 673–77 (2002).
143

Id. at 686.

Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 339, 356–58 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006)
(referring to the idea that “similar functional needs can be fulfilled by different institutions,” and
noting that “the recognition of functional equivalents gave a boost to the possibilities for
comparative law,” which the author refers to as “Equivalence Functionalism”).
144

145

ZWEIGERT & KÖETZ, supra note 9, at 34.

Nils Jansen, Comparative Law and Comparative Knowledge, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 305, 323–338 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006).
146

147

Hill, supra note 5, at 109.

148

ZWEIGERT & KÖETZ, supra note 9.

Fernanda G. Nicola, Family Law Exceptionalism in Comparative Law, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 777,
794 (2010).
149

RUDOLF VON IHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END (Isaac Husic trans., 1914); BRIAN Z.
TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY (2001); SUMMERS, supra note 12.
Legal scholars in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries who criticized the formalist approach to
150
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“Legal instrumentalism”—the idea of law as a tool or a means to an end—is
currently at the center of American legal thinking. 151 In many ways, law’s
instrumentality is also what makes it interesting as an object of study. 152
Those who derogate from the law as a tool axiom appear to challenge a whole
ontology of law. 153
The “culturalists” could be said to constitute a second group of
comparativists. 154 These scholars hold to the Savigny/Montesqui idea of
l’Esprit de loi 155—that positive law is the spirit of the people. 156 In this group,
scholars are less sanguine about the possibilities of transplanting whole legal
rules or institutions. These scholars believe that law is part of a cognition or
culture 157 that societies accept 158 or translate. 159 Thus, societies cannot
transport best practices. 160 Scholarship among this group ranges in a
judicial decision-making argued in favor of a pragmatic and sociological judicial process; law is a
technology that lawmakers—as sociological engineers—employ to achieve their goals. See
Malcolm M. Feeley, Three Voices of Socio-Legal Studies, 35 ISR. L. REV. 175 (2001). Scholars may
disagree about which goals to pursue or which ways to pursue them, but they can generally
agree that law is a means to an end. See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, THE PERILS OF
PERVASIVE LEGAL INSTRUMENTALISM (2006).
151

TAMANAHA, supra note 150; SUMMERS, supra note 12, at 179.

152

Law as Object, supra note 13; The Materiality of What?, supra note 31.

It may be for this reason that there is not as much a conversation about legal instrumentalism
as there are rumblings of dissatisfaction and disorientation in the form of isolated self-reflections
about the failure of particular projects. See Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, The
Relationship Between Law and Development: Optimists Versus Skeptics, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 895
(2008); David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on
the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 4 WIS. L. REV. 1062 (1974);
Merryman, supra note 1; Robert Dingwall, A Stranger at the Table: Reflections on Law, Society,
and the Higgs Boson, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 29 (2002). For complaints about discrepancies
between law on the books and law in action, see Feeley, supra note 150.
153

154 Taking on the Technicalities, supra note 12, at 106; Roger Cotterrell, Comparative Law and
Legal Culture, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 709, 710–11 (Mathias Reimann
& Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006).
155 Duncan Kennedy, Savigny’s Family/Patrimony Distinction and its Place in the Global
Genealogy of Classical Legal Thought, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 811, 811 (2010); Nicola, supra note 149.

Wigmore, supra note 141, at 51 (“. . . a legal institution can be fully comprehended only in the
light of the social, economic, religious, political, racial, and climatic circumstances which
surround it.”).

156

157 Louis F. del Duca & Alain A. Levasseur, Impact of Legal Culture and Legal Transplants on
the Evolution of the U.S. Legal System, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (2010).

Langer, supra note 8; see also Gianmaria Ajani, By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in
Russia and Eastern Europe, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 93 (1995).

158

Berkowitz et al., supra note 6; see also JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN
LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA 8–9 (1980) (discussing the unsuccessful attempts
to transplant and develop U.S. legal frameworks in developing countries due to a lack of
understanding “local language, law, polity, economy, or culture”).
159

160

Pistor, supra note 5.
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spectrum from weak cultural theorists, who believe that legal institutions
transfer between legal families, 161 to strong theorists, like Legrand who argue
that because national or local culture determines the nature and specifics of
legal institutions, it never make senses to talk about legal transplants. 162 In
comparative law and scholarship on legal transplants, this could be referred
to as the “does culture matter” 163 debate.
B. Objectification of Legal Knowledge
The commissions and task forces that investigated Aboriginal
confrontation within the criminal justice system were clearly situated on the
culture side of this debate. Aboriginal justice advocates saw conceptions of
justice as “integrally related to that society’s world views and life
philosophies.” 164 Reports noted vast differences between Euro-Canadian and
Aboriginal approaches to righting legal wrongs—Aboriginal approaches
sought restoration and healing, whereas Euro-Canadian criminal justice
sought deterrence and punishment. 165 This conflict between two sets of
justice values produced feelings of alienation and contributed to overincarceration of Aboriginal offenders. 166 Culture mattered.
On the other hand, the exercise in comparative law—comparing EuroCanadian and Aboriginal approaches to justice—was instrumental.
Researchers sought to show how traditional Aboriginal healing circles and
the sentencing phase of the criminal trial were functionally similar,
addressing the same social problem: crime in the community. Comparing
Euro-Canadian and Aboriginal approaches had a purpose. It was an effort to
look at “foreign” law to assist with a criminal law “domestic” reform
project. 167 Aboriginals’ feelings of alienation and negative experiences
originated in the incompatibility between two justice systems and
worldviews, 168 but ultimately the source of the problem—that law and culture
161

See generally THE COMMON CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, supra note 6.

See Legrand, supra note 34, at 122; see also Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not
Converging, 45 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 52, 81 (1996).

162

163 See generally Amartya Sen, How Does Culture Matter?, in CULTURE AND PUBLIC ACTION 37–
58 (Vijayendra Rao & Michael Walton eds., 2004).
164 HAMILTON & SINCLAIR, supra note 52, at 59. Individual scholars were coming to similar
conclusions. See, e.g., ROSS, supra note 44; FRIDERES & GADACZ, supra note 44; DIVERSITY AND
JUSTICE IN CANADA (Douglas E. King & John Winterdyk eds., 1999); ROSS GORDON GREEN,
JUSTICE IN ABORIGINAL COMMUNITIES: SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES (1998).

See DUMONT, supra note 50; Mandamin, supra note 58; see also ROYAL COMMISSION ON
ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, 1 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES: LOOKING
FORWARD LOOKING BACK 218 (1996); ROSS, supra note 44; FRIDERES & GADACZ, supra note 44.
165

166

See DUMONT, supra note 50, at 30–32; Giokas, supra note 16, at 187.

167

See Dubber, supra note 28, at 435–36.

168

See Goldbach et al., supra note 8, at 19.
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were intertwined—could also provide the solution. Those conceptions of
justice, integrally interwoven with worldviews, could be used as a tool to
address over-incarceration and the negative experience of Aboriginal
offenders. Aboriginal justice so clearly provided a solution, that in 1996
Robert Depew wrote, “[p]erhaps more than any other expanding alternativesto-the-State movement in Canada, ‘popular justice’ for [A]boriginal
communities has been embraced by its advocates as a solution to a range of
unique justice problems faced by [A]boriginal communities.” 169
Ralf Michaels argues that scholars often over-estimate the possibility
that legal systems will converge by ignoring entrenched legal paradigms, for
example, in determining jurisdiction for private law matters. 170 A similar
problem exists here, as law reformers sought to harmonize alternative
dispute resolution methods with Aboriginal justice approaches. Those
scholars and practitioners, who advocated adapting Aboriginal methods for
dealing with harm to the community, were optimistic 171 about the
possibilities of transplantation when the “origin” and “host” legal systems
had contrasting and entrenched legal paradigms. 172
This case study, however, represents more than merely an example of
harmonizing systems with entrenched legal paradigms or transplanting legal
institutions into unreceptive legal systems. 173 In addition, these transplanted
sentencing circles are an example of instrumentalizing the expressive.
Scholars, practitioners, and reformers articulated the legal expression of
Aboriginal culture. They conveyed the meaning of Aboriginal justice as a way
to identify that group and its particular concerns, 174 and then turned that
meaning back on itself in order to serve a useful function.
Sentencing circles represent both kinds of objectification of legal
knowledge: they are a reflection of Aboriginal culture, and they are a “thing
in the world” 175—a process that takes place at the sentencing phase of the
criminal trial. Here, though, the two genres of legal acts 176—the expressive
and instrumental genres—are integrated and conflated. The fact that
sentencing circles could serve as an identifier of Aboriginal culture and stand

169 Robert C. Depew, Popular Justice and Aboriginal Communities: Some Preliminary
Considerations, 36 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 21, 22 (1996).
170

Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1003, 1047–48 (2006).

171

See Merryman, supra note 1; Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 154.

172

Goldbach et al., supra note 8.

173

See Berkowitz et al., supra note 6.

174

Law as Object, supra note 13, at 192.

175

Id. at 190.

176

See generally id.
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in for traditional healing circles in the Euro-Canadian trial was instrumental
to the reformers’ goals.
Of course, overlap and intermingling of the instrumental and the
expressive in lawmaking is not unique to this Canadian case study. This
arises when law and development literature points to rule of law or
democratic freedom as the key to progress, 177 when state department
programs link gender equality indicators with national security, 178 or when
scholars point to constitutionalism as an organizing concept or archetype in
legal thought. 179 Canada’s reform of criminal sentencing procedures,
however, stands as a particularly poignant example of this movement toward
cultural and normative goals. It also brings to light the hazards associated
with material “things in the world” and the difficulties in mixing the material
with the symbolic. 180 Reformers had some expectations about the
transcendent aspects of sentencing circles, but sentencing circles are also
concretely present. Sentencing circles are procedures in which real people—
defendants, victims, and community members—participate.
C. Introducing Legal Techniques
See, e.g., Santos, supra note 36; Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, 32
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 315, 315–18 (2004); Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and Development:
Second Generation Reforms and the Incorporation of the Social, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 199, 202–03
(2004) (“at least at the rhetorical level, social issues have now been accepted both as ends of
development in and of themselves and as important factors to the achievement of general
economic growth. As a result, issues ranging from human rights to gender equality no longer
stand outside the development agenda, nor is their importance to economic development still
seriously debated.”); Daniel M. Brinks et al., Social Rights Constitutionalism: Negotiating the
Tension Between the Universal and the Particular, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 289, 290–91
(2015) (examining “the increasing inclusion of social and economic rights language in
constitutions” and noting “the remarkable diffusion of social rights into constitutions around the
world over the past fifty or sixty years”). See also discussion supra note 15 (examining the
overlap in instrumental and normative goals).
177

178 See, e.g., Annelise Riles, Smart Power: Feminism and Instrumentalism in US Foreign Policy
(2013) (unpublished paper presented at the Public International Law Workshop, London School
of Economics ) (on file with the author).

See, e.g., David Kennedy, The Mystery of Global Governance, in RULING THE WORLD?:
CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 37, 37–38 (Jeffrey L.
Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009) (“In the past few years, many have experimented with
the metaphor of a constitution to describe the legal order beyond the nation-state . . . . Others
have seen a constitutional moment in the emergence of human rights as a global vernacular for
the legitimacy of power . . . . Comparative constitutional law is front and center in their accounts
of how we are governed at the global level.”). Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and
Legal Thought: 1850–2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL
APPRAISAL 19–73 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006); Rodríguez-Garavito, supra note
36.
179

See generally WEBB KEANE, SIGNS OF RECOGNITION: POWERS AND HAZARDS OF
REPRESENTATION IN AN INDONESIAN SOCIETY 23–28 (1997) (by means of an ethnography of ritual
speech in Anakalang, discussing the “social force of signs” and their potential for failure because
symbols are at once both representations and material things).
180
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When reviewing the judicial decisions it became evident that—unlike the
instances of judges responding to sentencing circle requests with a list of
factors to consider—judges did not develop common law directive tools to
assist in processing sentencing circle recommendations. When a sentencing
circle was requested, judges limited their discretion by creating tests and
identifying criteria that had to be considered. By comparison, at the final
stage of crafting the sentence, judges treated the sentencing circle
recommendations inconsistently and without disciplined legal techniques.
Several judges did not give an account of the sentencing circle
recommendations for the record. 181 Sometimes judges compared the
recommendations to pre-sentence reports or victim impact statements, and at
other times judges seemed to approach the recommendations as if they were
a negotiated settlement. There were no tests, factors, or technical practices
that judges implemented to decide whether or not to include sentencing circle
recommendations into the final sentence. At this second stage—after the
sentencing circle has been conducted—judges were left without legal
techniques and technologies to assist in processing the information, in
weighing and balancing considerations, or in dealing with legal conflicts.
At first glance, this absence of legal devices may not seem problematic.
One could argue that conducting a sentencing circle allows the judge to get
more information about the accused and the community’s ability to help
monitor conditions. Nevertheless, the final sentencing rests with the judge.
While section 35(1) of the Constitution Act of 1982 recognizes Aboriginal
rights and practices, 182 these are not unlimited rights and must be
compatible with Canadian sovereign authority. 183 In other words, Canadian
sovereign authority has a monopoly on sentencing and incarceration, such
that the potential right to a pre-existing practice to conduct healing circles is
not unfettered.
This technical legal argument is not overly persuasive in light of a
technical counterargument. If the sentencing circle is merely an information
gathering exercise, there is no reason to require a test to decide whether a
sentencing circle can be held. If there are criteria to determine whether to
allow the request for a sentencing circle, the sentencing circle is ab initio—
distinct from other pre-sentencing practices without tests.

181

See discussion supra note 81.

182

The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.).

See Mitchell v. Minister of Nat’l Revenue, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 (Can.) (explaining that the
Supreme Court of Canada has indicated that even if an Aboriginal community had a tradition of
military force as part of its distinctive culture, there is no concurrent right to deploy an army and
that only the Canadian sovereign authority may maintain a military and use force within its own
territory).
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Sentencing circle recommendations may appear functionally similar to
pre-sentencing reports or victim impact statements. However, focusing on the
instrumental form—“the particular devices, practices, or orientations”—
184makes the differences apparent. The practices required to compose presentencing reports, victim impact statements, and sentencing circle
recommendations differ. 185 A pre-sentence report is put together by a
probation officer in the course of his or her employment, usually in the form
of a document with questions. 186 On the other hand, sentencing circle
recommendations come about through unscripted, guided discussion by
varied numbers of volunteers participating and observing. The process can be
lengthy and intrusive to the lives of the victims, the accused, and the
community.
The level and extent of community participation in sentencing circles
brings to mind jury or lay judge involvement in the legal system. 187 Scholars
have noted the similarities between jury participation and democracy. 188 The
link between political and judicial participation also figures prominently into
Law as Object, supra note 13, at 201; see also Pottage, supra note 31 (exploring Roman Law as
a way to examine law as a specific set of tools and technical devices for making relations); see
also COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 43, at 232 (arguing that legal theorists, social
scientists, and policy makers need to pay more attention to legal form and legal technique in
addition to the content of law and legal regulation).

184

See generally BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE: THE CONSTRUCTION OF
SCIENTIFIC FACTS 45–69 (1986) (describing the practices of laboratory scientists which “inscribe”
material substances into diagrammatic form, focusing on the particular and varied activities
which produce journal articles).
185

186 Kelly Hannah-Moffat & Paula Maurutto, Re-Contextualizing Pre-Sentence Reports: Risk and
Race, 12 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 262, 263, 267 (2010) (noting the number of jurisdictions in
Canada and the United States that are using “standardized actuarial risk assessment
instruments,” reports that focus on “‘objective’ criteria (i.e. type of offence, prior criminal history,
age and gender and sentence length) and factors that are empirically shown to be statistically corelated with recidivism,” which can be quickly scored).
187 See, e.g., Goldbach & Hans, supra note 26 (explaining that the provisions that make
sentencing circles permissible for Aboriginal offenders address the circumstances of that
population, and include the history of indigenous confrontation with colonizers and its current
effects and manifestations. It is therefore difficult to conceive of a situation where a nonaboriginal community would conduct a sentencing circle); see
R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R.
688, para. 58 (Can.); R. v. Poker (2006), 261 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 1 (Can. Nfld. & Lab. T.D.) (showing
that despite not taking sentencing circles out of the conversation about lay participation in
criminal law, historically and presently, many jurisdictions have and do restrict the selection of
juries or lay judges on the basis of socio-economic, occupational, educational or other
demographic factors); see S. Kutnjak Ivkovi, Exploring Lay Participation in Legal DecisionMaking: Lessons from Mixed Tribunals, 40 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 429 (2007) (examining lay judges
and the mixed tribunal system in Croatia); UNDERSTANDING WORLD JURY SYSTEMS THROUGH
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH (Martin F. Kaplan & Ana M. Martín eds., 2006) (exploring lay
participation and mixed tribunals in Italy, Poland, Germany, and Japan).

JOHN GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY: HOW JURY DELIBERATION PROMOTES CIVIC
ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION (2010); Valerie Hans, Introduction: Citizens as
Legal Decision Makers: An International Perspective, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 303 (2007).
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the Canadian reforms. 189 While the government eventually disaggregated the
political goals from the goal to increase Aboriginal participation in justice
design and delivery, the notion of “citizen-in-justice” has always been
integrated into the Aboriginal Justice Strategy mandate. 190 The Aboriginal
Justice Initiative and its successor, the Aboriginal Justice Strategy, could not
be legitimate if Aboriginal communities did not have the right to administer
justice. At the very least, the federal government has indicated its intention
to delegate authority to federally-funded Community Justice Committees in a
way that should make outright dismissal of sentencing circle
recommendations inappropriate. 191
Moreover, the 1996 amendments to the sentencing provisions in the
Criminal Code were clearly meant to address a lack of expertise that
sentencing scholars had previously identified. Judges were generalists
without consistent application of the purposes of sentencing or principles
governing legal sanctions. 192 In sentencing circles, in particular, cultural and
personal expertise shifts to the community. Unlike juries and lay judges,
“lay” participants in sentencing circles occupy the role of experts through
their knowledge of culturally appropriate procedures and often through a
familiarity with the accused. 193 As already noted, in many communities this
expertise is constituted, institutionalized, and bureaucratized through
government-funded Aboriginal Justice Committees.
V. CONCLUSION
Three developments reformed sentencing for Aboriginal offenders in the
criminal trial, including the ad hoc way in which judges began conducting
sentencing circles, the 1996 Criminal Code amendments that directed judges
to consider the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders, and the establishment
of the Aboriginal Justice Strategy. The examination of reported decisions
reveals that transplanting Aboriginal sentencing circles into the criminal
trial was neither an outright success nor failure. A “transplant effect” 194
occurred with judges seemingly unsure of how to integrate sentencing circle
recommendations or what was being asked of them during the final

LaPrairie, supra note 69; see also BRIDGING THE CULTURAL DIVIDE, supra note 16. Initially,
the rationale for funding the Aboriginal Justice Initiative was to support participation in justice
administration in order to prepare communities for treaty negotiations and some measure of
political administration. Id.

189

190ABORIGINAL

JUSTICE STRATEGY EVALUATION 2011, supra note 83.

191

See discussion supra note 81.

192

CANADIAN SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 68.

This also parallels historical accounts of juries in England who would testify to their personal
knowledge of local disputes.
193

194

Berkowitz et al., supra note 6, at 167.
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sentencing stage. The data reveals a stark contrast between legal criteria
developed at the request stage and the absence of technical legal knowledge
practices at the recommendation and sentencing stage.
The history of sentencing reform in Part II describes how law reform
projects constituted cultured procedures, which then became instruments
reformers could use. In comparing justice principles, Aboriginal justice
advocates identified an expression of Aboriginal culture as the solution to
both humanistic experiential and sociological goals. I call this an
instrumentalizing of the expressive, where an attempt to generate meaning
was not only the end-goal, but also the tool—the “thing in the world”—to
accomplish other goals that law reformers defined. 195 By way of conclusion,
this Article suggests that, when transforming the expressive into a tool, a
technical approach might be just the thing to reveal knowledge and enable
normative goals.
Rather than excoriate the judges who were involved in these decisions, I
want to appeal to the technical knowledge practices that legal intermediaries
already use to mediate risk. 196 Unfortunately, in American legal thinking, the
technical aspects of legal knowledge practices are conflated with legal
formalism as to how law does its work, and as to the opposite of what law
does. Those legal thinkers who reacted against formalism did so in part
because of formalism’s capacity to obscure what was felt to be politically
based decisions; 197 for example, decisions favoring corporations over labor. On
the other hand, with respect to sentencing circles, it is legal formality that
established sentencing circles as a legal procedure. Through the application
of tests and precedent, sentencing circles have become accessible within the
criminal trial. It is where form is absent, at the stage of processing the
sentencing circle’s recommendations, that knowledge and politics are
obscured.
In the case of sentencing circles, formalities may reveal reason. Instead of
obscuring preferences, legal technicalities at the recommendation stage may
force judges to be explicit about their preferences, such as between justice
theories or between expert versus “lay” decision-making in sentencing
offenders. Applying technical legal knowledge practices at this stage may also
be the kind of formality that facilitates, rather than hinders, desired
constitutive and corrective justice goals. In the very least, some kind of
technical legal practice by judges at the recommendation stage would
reinforce Aboriginal authority to administer justice, and confer respect on the
community’s voice. The technical part of law, including reports, legislation,
and logical legal reasoning delivered sentencing circles as a legal procedure
195

Law as Object, supra note 13, at 9–11.

196

VALVERDE, supra note 29, at 192.

197

See generally SUMMERS, supra note 12.
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in the criminal trial. Where technique was absent, knowledge became
obstructed and social normative goals were put in jeopardy. Especially where
an expression of culture is used as a tool, those engaged in law reform must
challenge themselves to explore outcomes as evidence of unmet expectations.
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Appendix A
Request for Sentencing Circles by Case, Year, and Court
Hit # In
Search

Case Name

Year Court

Crown
consent
and/or
request
not
reported

Request
inferred
from
appellate
level
decision

Request
Allowed

1

1

R. v. Smarch

2010 YKTC

x

Y

2

2

R. v. Cooper

2010 Ont. CA

x

3

4

R. v. Van Bibber

2010 YKTC

x

Y

4

6

R. v. Langan

2010 SK PC

x

Y

5

11

R. v. Favel

2009 SK QB

N

6

14

R. v. Pauchay

2009 SK PC

Y

7

17

R. v. Brooks

2008 NS PC

x

Y

8

19

R. v. Stimson

2008 AB PC

x

Y

9

24

R. v.
MacKendrick

2007 BC PC

x

Y

10

25

R. v. Elliot

2006 AB PC

x

Y

11

26

R. v. Braun

2006 BC PC

x

Y

12

27

R. v. Poker

2006 NL TD

x

Y

13

28

R. v.
Kahypeasewat

2006 SK PC

x

Y

14

30

R. v. James

2006 YKTC

x

Y

15

31

R. v. Kinistino

2006 SK PC

16

32

R. v. Craft

2006 YKTC

x

17

33

R. v. Desnomie

2005 SK CA

x

x

Y

18

34

R. v. Cappo

2005 SK CA

x

x

Y

19

36

R. v. Anaquod

2005 SK CA

x

x

Y

20

37

R. v. Gopher

2005 SK QB

21

39

R. v. J. (J.)

2004 NL CA

x

Y

N
Y

N
x

x

Y
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22

41

R. v. Frank

2004 SK CA

x

N

23

44

R. v. Mackinaw

2004 BC PC

x

N

24

46

R. v. Morris ∗

2004 BC PC

x

Y

25

47

R. v. Joyea

2004 SK CA

x

x

Y

26

54

R. v. L. (B.)

2002 AB CA

x

x

Y

27

55

R. v. Munson

2001 SK QB

28

56

R. v. Haines

2001 BCCA

x

x

N

29

58

R. v. K (N.T.)

2001 SK CA

x

x

Y

30

59

R. v. Stick (C.)* ∗

2001 SK QB

31

72

R. v. Paul (D.)

1998 NB PC

32

79

R. v. C. (H.K.)

1997 SK CA

33

81

R. v. R. (H.)

1997 AB PC

34

83

R. v. Pena (M.J.) 1997 BC SC

35

84

R. v. McKay
(R.W.)

1997 AB PC

x

36

86

R. v. McDonald
(D.P.)

1997 SK CA

x

37

87

R. v.
Manyfingers
(C.J.)

1996 AB PC

x

38

89

R. v. Nicholas
(B.L.)

1996 NB PC

39

90

R. v. Severight
(A.D.)

1996 SK CA

x

x

Y

40

93

R. v. Johns (J.C.) 1995 YK CA

x

x

Y

41

95

R. v. Taylor
(W.B.)

1995 SK QB

x

42

96

R. v. John (R.C.) 1995 AB CA

x

43

98

R. v. Rope

1994 SK QB

N

N
x

Y
Y

x

Y
N
Y
x

Y
Y

Y

Y
x

Y
Y

∗
R. v. Morris: the decision refers to a "talking circle" and the judge and Crown were not present;
however the judge treated the procedure like a sentencing circle and accepted the
recommendations.
∗∗
R. v. Stick: the reported case is an order to set aside decision denying application for holding a
sentencing circle, reviewing judge remanded case back to trial judge to hear submissions about
whether or not to hold a sentencing circle.
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99

R. v. Johnson
(G.)

1994 YK CA

45

101

R. v. R. (S.)

1994 NF SC

46

102

R. v. Morin (I.)

1993 SK QB

47

103

R. v. Cheekinew

1993 SK QB

R. v. Moses

1992 YK TC

48

105
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x

Y
N

x

Y
N

x

Y
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Appendix B
Whether the Judge Followed the Sentencing Circle’s
Recommendations: Cases Where Sentencing Circles were
Held, by Case, Year, and Court
Hit # In
Search

Case Name

Year Court

Recommendation
Followed

1

1

R. v. Smarch

2010 YKTC

U∗

2

2

R. v. Cooper

2010 Ont. CA

N

3

4

R. v. Van Bibber

2010 YKTC

Y

4

6

R. v. Langan

2010 SK PC

N

5

12

R. v. Pauchay (II)

2009 SK PC

N

6

17

R. v. Brooks

2008 NS PC

Y

7

19

R. v. Stimson

2008 AB PC

U

8

24

R. v. MacKendrick

2007 BC PC

U

9

25

R. v. Elliot

2006 AB PC

N

10

27

R. v. Poker

2006 NL TD

N

11

28

R. v. Kahypeasewat

2006 SK PC

U

12

30

R. v. James

2006 YKTC

U

13

32

R. v. Craft

2006 YKTC

Y

14

33

R. v. Desnomie

2005 SK CA

U

15

34

R. v. Cappo

2005 SK CA

Y

16

36

R. v. Anaquod

2005 SK CA

U

17

39

R. v. J. (J.)

2004 NL CA

Y

18

46

R. v. Morris

2004 BC PC

Y

∗*

U—Unknown: No description of recommendations; there was no information in case about
what, if any, recommendations were presented following the sentencing circle.

∗
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19

47

R. v. Joyea

2004 SK CA

U

20

54

R. v. L. (B.)

2002 AB CA

Y

21

58

R. v. K (N.T.)

2001 SK CA

Y

22

72

R. v. Paul (D.)

1998 NB PC

Y

23

75

R. v. Taylor

1997 SK CA

N

24

79

R. v. C. (H.K.)

1997 SK CA

U ∗**

25

81

R. v. R. (H.) ∗*∗*

1997 AB PC

N

26

84

R. v. McKay (R.W.)

1997 AB PC

Y

27

86

R. v. McDonald (D.P.)

1997 SK CA

U

28

87

R. v. Manyfingers (C.J.) 1996 AB PC

Y

29

89

R. v. Nicholas (B.L.)

1996 NB PC

Y

30

90

R. v. Severight (A.D.)

1996 SK CA

U

31

93

R. v. Johns (J.C.)

1995 YK CA

U

32

95

R. v. Taylor (W.B.)

1995 SK QB

Y

33

96

R. v. John (R.C.)

1995 AB CA

Y

34

98

R. v. Rope

1994 SK QB

Y

35

99

R. v. Johnson (G.)

1994 YK CA

Y

36

102

R. v. Morin (I.)

1993 SK QB

Y

R. v. Moses

1992 YK TC

Y

37

∗∗
∗∗∗

107

The judge left during the process.
The judge left during the process.

The Circle was conducted by Edmonton Native Youth Justice Committee (“ENYJC”), a group
recognized by the Department of Justice. ENYCJ normally holds circles to assist in
recommendations to the Edmonton Youth Court. However, in this case the defendant was
charged as an adult because he was twenty-one years old at the time of the offence.

∗∗∗∗

